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IN the years that have elapsed since the beginning of the war, politi-
cal trials have not been an uncommon phenomenon in the world. Until
the indictment and trial in New York of the eleven Communist lead-
ers,' however, we have not, in the United States, had a clean cut exam-
ple. The Hiss,2 Coplon I and Bridges litigation 4 had sharp political
overtones, to be sure, but they were, after all, genuine criminal trials.
The Communist trial, on the other hand, came much nearer being a
political trial with criminal overtones.
In this trial, defendants were charged with violating the Smith Act'
by conspiring (1) to organize as the Communist Party of the United
States, a society teaching and advocating the overthrow and destruc-
tion of the United States Government by force and violence, and (2) to
teach and advocate the overthrow of the United States Government
by force and violence. The trial began January 17, 1949, and ended
with a verdict of guilty being entered against the defendants on Octo-
ber 14 of the same year. On that date Judge Medina also addressed
the defendants' lawyers, saying: "Now I turn to some unfinished
business." 6 He then read part of a contempt certificate and orders
made under Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
According to the certificate the lawyers, without a hearing, stood
convicted of criminal contempts of court. The orders imposed a sen-
tence of four months in jail on lawyer Crocket, thirty days on lawyer
McCabe, and six months on lawyers Sacher, Gladstein, Isserman and
the same on defendant Dennis, Counsel pro se.
* Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
t Associate Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
1. United States v. Dennis et al., 183 F.2d 201 (2nd Cir. 1950), cert. granted, 19 U.S.L.
WEEK 3116 (1950).
2. United States v. Hiss, 184 F.2d- (2nd Cir. 1950).
3. United States v. Coplon et al., 88 F.Supp. 910, 912, 915, 921 (S.D. N.Y. 1949).
4. United States v. Bridges et al., 86 F.Supp. 922, 931 (N.D. Cal. 1949); United
States v. Bridges et al., 87 F.Supp. 14 (N.D. Cal. 1949); United States v. Bridges et al., 90
F.Supp. 973 (N.D. Cal. 1950) (revocation of citizenship).
5. 54 STAT. 670 (1940), 8 U.S.C. §§ 137, 155, 156a, 451-460 (1946), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2385,
2387.
6. Extract from Stenographer's Minutes, Appendix to Appellant's Brief in the court
of Appeals, 81A. Transcript of Record, pp. 16, 121.
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The certificate contained a preamble and forty specifications. The
preamble read in part:
"By way of preliminary, I may say that I would have overlooked
or at most merely reprimanded counsel for conduct which appeared
to be the result of the heat of controversy or of that zeal in the de-
fense of a client or in one's own defense which might understand-
ably have caused one to overstep the bounds of strict propriety.
Before the trial had progressed very far, however, I was reluctantly
forced to the conclusion that the acts and statements to which I am
about to refer were the result of an agreement between these de-
fendants, deliberately entered into in a cold and calculating man-
ner, to do and say these things for the purpose of: (1) causing such
delay and confusion as to make it impossible to go on with the trial;
(2) provoking incidents which they intended would result in a mis-
trial; and (3) impairing my health so that the trial could not con-
tinue.
"I find that the acts, statements and conduct of each of the de-
fendants, hereinafter specified, constituted a deliberate and wilful
attack upon the administration of justice, an attempt to sabotage
the functioning of the federal judicial system, and misconduct of so
grave a character as to make the mere imposition of fines a futile
gesture and a wholly insufficient punishment. To maintain the
dignity of the court and to preserve order in the courtroom, under
these circumstances, was a task of the utmost difficulty. There was,
accordingly, no alternative than to give the repeated warnings
which from time to time I gave, and to postpone the impositions of
the sentence until the close of the case. To have done otherwise
would inevitably have broken up the trial and thus served the ends
which these defendants tried so hard to attain. As isolated quota-
tions from or references to the transcript can give but a partial view
of the acts, statements and conduct above referred to, I hereby
make the entire record part of these proceedings.
"Accordingly, I adjudge the following guilty of the several criminal
contempts described below .
Specification I read:
"During the entire trial, Messrs. Sacher, Gladstein, Crockett,
McCabe, and Isserman, attorneys and counsellors-at-law, and after
March 17, 1949, Mr. Dennis, attorney pro se, joined in a wilful,
deliberate, and concerted effort to delay and obstruct the trial of
United States v. Foster, et al., C 128-87, for the purpose of causing
such disorder and confusion as would prevent a verdict by a jury
on the issues raised by the indictment; and for the purpose of bring-
ing the Court and the entire Federal judicial system into general
discredit and disrepute, by endeavoring to divert the attention of
the Court and jury from the serious charge against their clients of a
conspiracy in substance to teach and advocate the overthrow of the
Government of the United States by force and violence, by attack-
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ing the Presiding Judge and all the Judges of this Court, the jury
system in this District, the Department of Justice of the United
States, the President of the United States, the police of New York
City, and the public press of New York and other cities.
"To effect this plan, these defendants in this proceeding contemp-
tuously and without justification
"a. Disregarded numerous warnings of the Court concerning
their wilful delaying tactics, except for ironical references thereto;
"b. Suggested that various findings by the Court were made for
the purpose of newspaper headlines;
"c. Insinuated that there was connivance between the Court and
the United States Attorney;
"d. Insisted on objecting one after another to rulings of the
Court, despite a ruling on the first day of the trial, repeated several
times thereafter, that all objections and exceptions would inure to
the benefit of each of their clients unless disclaimed;
"e. Persisted in making long, repetitious, and unsubstantial
arguments, objections, and protests, working in shifts, accom-
panied by shouting, sneering and snickering;
"f. Urged one another on to badger the Court;
"g. Repeatedly made charges against the Court of bias, preju-
dice, corruption, and partiality;
"h. Made a succession of disrespectful, insolent, and sarcastic
comments and remarks to the Court;
"i. Disregarded rulings on the admissibility of evidence so as to
endeavor to place before the jury by leading questions the subject
matter excluded;
"k. Persisted in asking questions on excluded subject matters,
knowing that objections would be sustained, to endeavor to create
a false picture of bias and partiality on the part of the Court;
"I. Accused the Court of racial prejudice without any founda-
tion: and
"m. Generally conducted themselves in a most provocative
mannei in an endeavor to call forth some intemperate or undignified
response from the Court which could be relied upon as a demonstra-
tion of the Court's unfitness to preside over the trial." 7
The remaining specifications consisted of excerpts from the record,
which were largely colloquies between the attorneys and the Judge
and for the most part illustrated points (a) to (m) under Specification I.
On appeal the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit consisting of
Judges Augustus N. Hand, Jerome Frank and Charles E. Clark upheld
Judge Medina's decision except as to Specifications I, XV, and XVIII.3
Judge Hand favored upholding all the specifications except XV and
XVIII which he thought failed to show with sufficient clarity what
seemed to be the gist of their charge "that Sacher was attempting to
7. United States v. Sacher et al., 182 F.2d 416,430-432 (2nd Cir. 1950).
8. Ibid.
1951]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
mislead the Court." Judge Clark dissented, holding that there should
have been a hearing on all charges and that the proceedings should
have been remanded for that purpose. Judge Frank agreed with Judge
Hand except as to Specification I but noted that this did not affect the
result since the sentences under each specification were to run con-
currently and were of the same length.
This article will not discuss the question whether these lawyers were
or were not guilty of criminal contempt of court on one or more occa-
sions during the trial. Attention here will be focused on the important
Constitutional and procedural issue raised by the case. Could Judge
Medina proceed in this case, as he did, without notice and hearing and
without disqualifying himself?
Broadly speaking, this question focuses attention on one of the
troublesome problems arising in Anglo-American jurisprudence-the
apparent conflict between the necessity for an orderly administration
of justice and the preservation of those safeguards of fair play and
substantial justice in criminal proceedings which we ordinarily asso-
ciate with the liberal, democratic tradition.
To be sure, the very notion of fair play and substantial justice as-
sumes a court, a hearing and an orderly administration. The idea can-
not be permitted to destroy itself. Accordingly, when conduct occurs
in the courtroom of such a nature as to obstruct orderly judicial pro-
cedure, it must be dealt with as the necessities require. There will be
occasions when procedure to insure fairness can be preserved only by
dealing with those who threaten its destruction by means short of
those usually guaranteed to persons accused of ordinary crime. It is on
this basis only that any power at all exists to punish for a criminal
contempt without a hearing or (even with a hearing) without a jury.
And for more than a century, the trend in legislation and decision in
the United States has been to confine this authority to "the least possi-
ble power adequate to the end proposed." I This is the application of
the principle of due process of law to contempt cases and the resolution
of the apparent conflict between the necessities of orderly judicial
administration and the preservation of safeguards for the accused.
Thus, any modification in contempt proceedings of the usual safeguards
afforded an accused can only be permitted where it is absolutely neces-
sary for the preservation of orderly judicial administration.
Criminal contempt ordinarily results in punishment. In the light of
modern scientific theories, punishment for criminal contempt may be
9. Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 227 (U.S. 1821). The principle was recently
reiterated in In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227 (1945). For other statements see also Hough J.,
in Rosner v. United States, 10 F.2d 675, 676 (2d Cir. 1926); Ex parte Hudgings; 249 U.S.
378, 383 (1919); cf. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 451 (1911). These
cases are briefly discussed from the perspective here stressed in Nelles, Summary Power to
Punishfor Contempt, 31 CoL. L. REv. 956, 958-960 (1931).
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regarded as a vestige of the archaic principle of retribution, that is,
the vindication of public right through the suffering of the offender."0
The question may be raised whether punishment is ever necessary to
prevent or terminate an interruption of orderly judicial administration.
There is little doubt that in most, indeed, perhaps all cases, the adminis-
tration of justice can be adequately protected by means other than
punishment, as for example, by warnings, prompt use of the marshal,
the ejection or threatened ejection of the offender from the courtroom,
temporary recess or adjournment. However, the Congress and the
Supreme Court have recognized that punishment of contemptuous
conduct, may occasionally be necessary to maintain or restore orderly
procedure," and this basic assumption will not be questioned here.
In an era when the preservation of individual liberty is a vital issue
all over the world, the legislation and case law which have developed
on this issue should represent rigidly the outside limits of judicial
power to punish for criminal contempt. What is left of safeguards for
the accused in the extreme cases should be scrupulously preserved.
Any real or apparent deviations should be appraised strictly in the
light of the policies involved and the principle of reconciliation of the
competing demands of safeguards for the accused and the necessities
of orderly judicial administration.
I. PROCEDURE WITHOUT NOTICE AND HEARING
Under what circumstances may the court proceed to punish for con-
tempt without notice and hearing? As will be seen, this question in-
volves two issues. First, what are the minimum conditions, if any,
required by due process to alleviate the arbitrary results of a denial of
notice and hearing where such denial is necessary? Second, what is the
nature of the misbehavior that makes necessary the denial of notice
and hearing?
The proper procedure for punishing contempt of court is set out in
Rule 42 of The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which reads as
follows:
"(a) Summary Disposition. A criminal contempt may be pun-
ished summarily if the judge certifies that he saw or heard the con-
duct constituting contempt and that it was committed in the
actual presence of the court. The order of contempt shall recite
the facts and shall be signed by the judge and entered of record.
"(b) Disposition upon Notice and Hearing. A criminal contempt
10. See, e.g., Eliasberg, Repentance and Remorse in Rehabilitation in HANDBOOK OF
CORRECTIONAL PSYCHOLOGY (1947); RUsCHE & KIRCHBEIMER, PUNISHMENT AND SOCIAL
STRUCTURE (1939) cited in DESSION, CRIMINAL LAW ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC ORDER
56 n.7 (1948).
11. Compare discussion by Nelles, Summary Power to Punish for Contempt, 31 COL. L.
REv. 956 (1931).
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except as provided in subdivision (a) of this rule shall be prosecuted
on notice. The notice shall state the time and place of hearing,
allowing a reasonable time for the preparation of the defense, and
shall state the essential facts constituting the criminal contempt
charged and describe it as such. The notice shall be given orally
by the judge in open court in the presence of the defendant or, on
application of the United States attorney or of an attorney ap-
pointed by the court for that purpose, by an order to show cause
or an order of arrest. The defendant is entitled to a trial by jury in
any case in which an act of Congress so provides. He is entitled to
admission to bail as provided in these rules. If the contempt
charged involves disrespect to or criticism of a judge, that judge
is disqualified from presiding at the trial or hearing except with the
defendant's consent. Upon a verdict or finding of guilt, the court
shall enter an order fixing the punishment." 12
The lawyers, among other things, contended that the judge should not
have proceeded under Subdivision (a), that the circumstances called
for notice and hearing and the disqualification of the trial judge under
Subdivision (b). They claimed on the basis of certain language in the
preamble and Specification I that the Judge had not punished them
for their specific in-court misconduct as such. Such misconduct was
mentioned in the certificate solely as part of the overall charge of con-
spiracy. This, they argued, constituted the sole contempt of which
they were found guilty without a hearing. But steps in the conspiracy
might have taken place out of court. The Judge's certificate stated
nothing to the contrary. The certificate did not certify, as required by
Rule 42(a), that the judge "saw or heard" the contempt, namely the
entire conspiracy, nor did it charge that all its essential steps occurred
in the "actual presence" of the court. The defendants also claimed
that the procedure set forth in Rule 42(a) could not be applied because
the actual intention to obstruct justice was an element of their con-
tempt. They contended that whenever a contempt conviction is de-
pendent on an evil intention, due process demands that the accused
be allowed an opportunity to defend himself with evidence showing
his good faith. Rule 42(a) is not meant to apply under such circum-
stances.
The defendants challenged the application of Rule 42(a) still further.
They pointed out that American judicial tradition has regarded
contempt convictions without a hearing as drastic measures to be
applied only in those instances where instant conviction is absolutely
necessary to insure uninterrupted judicial administration. Here this
could not be the case since the judge had waited till near the end of the
trial to punish previous misbehavior.' 3
12. Promulgated pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 687, 689 (1946).
13. See Appellant's Brief before Court of Appeals, I A, B and II.
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In terms of the above outlined general analysis of the function of,
and limitations on, the contempt power, these arguments come to this:
First, the minimum conditions required by due process to alleviate the
arbitrary results of a denial of notice and hearing are that every im-
portant phase of the alleged contempt must Irave been heard and seen
by the judge in court. In addition, due process does not permit the
elimination of a hearing where actual intention to obstruct justice is an
essential element of the contempt. A hearing could not be omitted
here because the certificate charged a not altogether present, visible
and audible conspiracy, including a previously formed intention on the
part of the defendants to obstruct the administration of justice. Sec-
ond, due process permits deviation from the hearing procedure only
when the nature of the misbehavior is such that speedy conviction
and punishment of the disturber is absolutely necessary for the preser-
vation of orderly judicial administration. Here this was not the case.
Judge Medina did not act with dispatch nor did he make any attempt to
do s 6 . On the contrary, he deliberately waited till near the end of the
trial to punish the offenders. In a number of instances this amounted
to a delay of several months between the cited event and the conviction
and order of punishment.
Now, these contentions in detail.
THE FIRST CONTENTION: RULE 42(A)'S LIMITED APPLICATION AS A
SUBSTITUTE GUARANTY FOR A HEARING:
A casual reader, in looking at Specification I and the Preamble,
could get the impression that the judge was saying in part that the
lawyers had got together and plotted to disrupt the trial by their
courtroom antics. On reflection, it might also occur to him that this
planning could not all have been done in the courtroom in front of the
judge. Nevertheless the reader might still refuse to take seriously the
notion that the trial judge's remarks should somehow bring about a
reversal of the convictions. The argument might strike him as too
simple on the one hand and too hypertechnical on the other. A glance
at the material in the other specifications or previous knowledge of the
case might convince him that what the, lawyers did was too strong
medicine for any judge. "Surely," the reader might think, "the Judge
should be allowed to use the full measure of his power where there
seems to be such flagrant abuse. A more sophisticated approach to
both the certificate and the Rule would certainly show the Judge's
action proper!"
Actually, the contrary seems to be true. A thorough analysis tends
to indicate that insofar as the lawyers' first contention is concerned,
the Judge's action violates guarantees of fair procedure generally
extended even to those accused of the vilest crimes. The steps leading
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to this conclusion are neither simple nor hypertechnical. It will be
seen that the certificate may be read in several possible but not equally
plausible ways. No matter which of these constructions is adopted,
the Judge's procedure under Rule 42(a) is improper.
According to one of these constructions both Specification I and the
Preamble find the defehilants guilty of a conspiracy to obstruct justice
through a wilful, calculated and deliberate plan. The remaining
specifications are illustrations of this overall charge. The conspiracy
deliberately to obstruct justice constitutes the only contempt of which
the defendants are held guilty, or an essential element of such con-
tempt or contempts, or, at least important evidence of the degree of
guilt which the judge considered. The mere misconduct in court is not
what the lawyers were punished for. Their conviction, on this con-
struction, is contrary to Rule 42(a) in two respects. First the con-
spiracy might have included steps which took place out of court. Sec-
ond the conspiracy charge rested on a finding of the defendants' actual
state of mind.
The history of Rule 42(a) reveals its purpose and indicates that the
denial of a hearing here constitutes a serious infringement of due
process. There is a fundamental policy behind the Rule's requirement
that the contempt be committed in the court's "actual presence" and
that the judge certify that he "saw or heard" the misconduct. This
requirement means literally that a hearing may be omitted only when
all the elements of the contempt occur before a judge sitting on the
bench. Then it is a virtual impossibility that a hearing would produce
new material for the defense and the traditional guarantees of due
process are not greatly infringed. But in this case, a hearing might
have produced evidence about what occurred or did not occur out of
court as steps in the conspiracy. The fact that the judge saw enough to
justify an inference of an agreement does not justify elimination of a
hearing. It is precisely as to matters merely inferred that the accused
might be able to produce evidence in defense. Again, the element of
deliberation, calculation and wilfulness is a subjective aspect of the
misconduct which might be inferred from it and other circumstances.
However, a hearing might produce evidence showing the good faith
with which defendants, perhaps through mistake, ignorance, or poor
judgment, committed acts which in fact disturbed the trial. Whether
this would ultimately result in acquittal is not relevant here. Even the
criminal against whom the evidence appears to be overwhelming is
entitled to make a defense.
Another construction of the certificate is that adopted by Judge
Hand as the sole way of reading Specification I and one of two alterna-
tive ways of reading the Preamble. Under this construction the refer-
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ences to an agreement or conspiracy are read as no more than state-
ments that the misconduct of the defendants was wilful and deliberate.
This construction seems forced. In all likelihood it does not reflect
the true intentions of the trial judge. His language seems to accuse,
convict and punish the defendants for planning and carrying out a
sinister plot to obstruct the trial. It is unlikely that he intended to
convict and punish the defendants to the extent he did for a less color-
ful crime. Judge Medina did not act hastily. Presumably his language
was measured. Be that as it may, even under Judge Hand's interpreta-
tion the deliberate intention to obstruct justice is retained in addition
to the overt misconduct as an essential element of the contempt. This
intent might have been inferred from what occured in court. But here
again, the inference is not enough. As to their state of mind even their
testimony alone would be evidence of good faith they could have pro-
duced at a hearing.
Judge Frank held that Specification I charged a conspiracy and con-
viction under it could not be sustained. But he construed the cer-
tificate so as to uphold the punishment of the defendants under the
remaining specifications. He decided that Specification I had no con-
nection with the remaining specifications and therefore did not make
those part of the conspiracy charge. It will be seen that this construc-
tion is not the most likely one. Judge Frank also eliminated the effect
of the preamble by making use of what was Judge Hand's second
alternative interpretation. According to both Judges Hand and Frank,
the preamble does not find the defendants guilty of a conspiracy and
thus convert the charges in the remaining specifications into a mere
recapitulation of illustrative incidents in the execution of the plot. On
the contrary these remain separate charges. The preamble refers to
the conspiracy not as the contempt, or one contempt, or even an ele-
ment of any contempt, but simply as the type of background material
not established at trial which a judge may generally use to determine
the length of the sentence once the defendant has been found guilty.
It will be shown there is enough in the preamble to suggest that the
conspiracy is not an outside circumstance but the entire contempt or
at least an essential element of the contempt. Even were the con-
spiracy merely an outside circumstance, considered only to determine
the extent of punishment, the cases show that in contempt proceedings
a hearing must be held if evidence to mitigate the punishment might
be brought forth. The considerations that permit a deviation from
this requirement in many other criminal proceedings are not present
in criminal contempt.
These possible alternative constructions will now be considered in
detail.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Construction x. Rule 42(a) and Conspiracy
(a) The Certificate and the Specifications
It will be recalled that the Judge "would have overlooked or at most
merely reprimanded counsel for conduct which appeared to be the re-
sult of the heat of controversy or of that zeal in the defense of a client or
in one's own defense which might understandably have caused one to
overstep the bounds of strict propriety," were it not for the fact that
"before the trial had progressed very far" he was forced to the con-
clusion that "the acts and statements to which I am about to refer
were the result of an agreement between these defendants deliberately
entered into in a cold and calculating manner . . . to do and say these
things." He also thought that these things were done and said for the
purpose of: "(1) causing such delay as would make it impossible to go
on with the trial, (2) provoking incidents which they intended would
result in a mistrial; and (3) impairing my health so that the trial could
not continue." He then went on to say that the "acts, statements, and
conduct of each of the defendants . . . constituted a deliberate and
wilful attack upon the administration of justice, an attempt to sabotage
the functioning of the federal judicial system, and misconduct of so
grave a character as to make the mere imposition of fines a futile gesture
and a wholly insufficient punishment. . . .Accordingly I adjudge the
following guilty of the several criminal contempts." These portions
of the preamble seem to indicate that conspiracy was the gist of the con-
tempt of which the defendants were declared guilty under the entire
certificate. An actual evil purpose--i.e., in addition to the mere volun-
tary doing of the overt acts-which is, with some notable exceptions,
held essential to the crime of conspiracy, is here explicitly made an
element of the crime. The agreement is said to have been "deliberately
entered into [by the defendants] in a cold and calculating manner" for a
series of specific corrupt and evil purposes.
The Judge's statement at the outset that were it not for the con-
spiracy and the specific evil intent he would have excused conduct
resulting from "heat" and "zeal," conceivably could be regarded as a
mere theoretical postulate having no specific reference to the case.
However, the phrase "before the trial had progressed very far" seems
to be a reference at least to some of the specific incidents of contempt.
Subsequent allusion to "the acts and statements to which I am about to
refer" or "hereinafter specified" supports the construction that the
findings of conspiracy and actual intent to corrupt justice refer to all
of the certificate's specifications. The word "accordingly" in the final
sentence quoted underscores this by showing that the material in the
preamble constitutes a very important portion of the ingredients mak-
ing up the finding of guilt.
Similarly Specification I states that the defendants "joined in a wil-
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ful, deliberate, and concerted effort to delay and obstruct the trial for
the purpose of. . . .To effect this plan, these defendants contemptu-
ously and without justification. . . ." Here the judge lists items a to
m, quoted above, which are simply a statement in more general terms of
the incidents quoted in the remaining specifications. In other words,
Specification I seems to find that the defendants joined in a "con-
certed effort" or conspiracy which involved a "wilful" and "deliberate"
scheme to "delay and obstruct the trial" for a series of contemptuous
purposes. It then seems to make the more specific findings a to m a part
of the general finding of conspiracy. At the very least, the conspiracy
including the actual corrupt purpose becomes an essential element of
the charges made in points a to m and presumably of the remaining
specifications which they paraphrase. This construction seems further
borne out by the fact that the Judge imposed separate but concurrent
sentences on the various defendants wherever they were mentioned in
any of Specifications II to XL. In each case the sentence equalled the
concurrent sentence imposed for their misbehavior in Specification I.
This was so although the charges in Specification I were far more
serious than those mentioned in any one of the other specifications.
This pattern of sentencing suggests that the judge actually treated
all the Specifications as part of Specification 1.14 Other possible con-
structions to support Judge Frank's notion that Specification I has no
connection with the other Specifications will be discussed later on.
(b) Rule 42(a) and out-of-court phases of the conspiracy
Once the certificate is construed as above, it appears that the Judge
charged a contempt that did not take place entirely in the court's
actual presence and that had not been fully seen or heard by him.
The agreement or conspiracy is something more than the overt acts
which occurred in court. Yet as to the conspiracy, the certificate did
not state where or when it originated or that the judge saw or heard
every phase of it. It is possible and probable that part of the con-
spiracy, if any, occurred outside the court and was at best inferred by
the judge from the evidence before him. This would not meet the literal
requirement of Rule 42(a).
Those whom this result still strikes as arbitrary may seek to avoid it,
either by interpreting the rule less strictly, or by construing the cer-
tificate differently. Two judges of the Court of Appeals sought to con-
strue the certificate differently and their efforts will be discussed subse-
quently. Here it will be demonstrated that once the view of the cer-
tificate set out above is accepted, a strict application of the rule is the
only correct one, not arbitrary but based on sound policies of fairness
long part of the conception of due process in the American legal tradition.
14. See Judge Clark's dissent, 182 F.2d 416,464 n.3 (2d Cir. 1950).
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A literal application of the rule to the certificate as here construed
might be thought arbitrary or overly technical because so much of the
consequences of the agreement, the really disruptive acts, occurred in
court. Surely the rule did not intend to limit the judge's power be-
cause what on the surface at least seems like a minor phase of the con-
tempt occurred out of court. A little ingenuity certainly would sug-
gest ways of interpreting the rule more liberally. For example, perhaps
the "presence" requirements is satisfied by a sort of constructive
"omni-presence" of the judge which extends to all corners of the uni-
verse where anything is done that may have a tendency to affect
docketed, existing or past trials? Or if this fiction should seem absurd
because it would allow no basis for distinguishing between Rules 42(a)
and (b), since all contempt must at least have such a tendency, isn't it
enough that some consequences of the conspiracy occurred in court
especially where these constituted adequate circumstantial proof of
the out-of-court conduct? Or could one not borrow a fiction some-
times used in conspiracy law in other contexts, that the conspiracy
recurs with every act of its execution? Could not this doctrine be
applied here so that when one or more of the acts occur in court then
the entire conspiracy is regarded as seen and heard by the judge and
as having occurred in his actual presence?
The history of Rule 42(a) indicates that it must be applied strictly;
that none of the alternative interpretations mentioned above have
validity; and that this position involves more fundamental issues than
a mere technical adherence to the rules.
The notes left by draftsmen of the Rule 11 show that it codifies im-
portant principles of due process embodied in two leading Supreme
Court cases, Ex parte Terry 16 and Cooke v. United States.17 In the
Terry case, Mrs. Terry had misbehaved in the courtroom. The judge
ordered the marshal to remove her. Terry, an attorney, then and
there, while the marshal tried to obey the judge, assaulted and beat
the marshal with a gun. Then he fled. Shortly thereafter the judge
sentenced him for contempt, without notice and hearing and in ab-
sentia. The Supreme Court denied a writ of habeas corpus. Justice
Harlan's opinion reads in part:
"It is undoubtedly a general rule in all actions, whether prosecuted
by private parties, or by the government,-that is, in civil and
criminal cases,-that 'a sentence of a court pronounced against a
party without hearing him, or giving him an opportunity to be
heard, is not a judicial determination of his rights, and is not en-
titled to respect in any other tribunal.' Windsor v. M11cVeigh, 93
U.S. 274, 277. But there is another rule of almost immemorial
15. STEWART, FEDERAL RuLEs OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 336-37 (1945).
16. 128 U.S. 289 (1888).
17. 267 U.S. 517 (1925).
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antiquity, and universally acknowledged, which is equally vital to
personal liberty, and to the preservation of organized society, be-
cause upon its recognition and enforcement depend the existence
and authority of the tribunals established to protect the rights of
the citizens, whether of life, liberty, or property, and whether as-
sailed by the illegal acts of the government or by the lawlessness or
violence of individuals. It has relation to the class of contempts
which, being committed in the face of a court, imply a purpose to
destroy or impair its authority, to obstruct the transaction of its
business, or to insult or intimidate those charged with the duty of
administering the law." 18
The opinion also contains the following quotation from Blackstone.
"If the contempt be committed in the face of the court, the offender
may be instantly apprehended and imprisoned, at the discretion of
the judges, without any further proof or examination. But in mat-
ters that arise at a distance, and of which the court cannot have so
perfect a knowledge, unless by the confession of the party or the
testimony of others, if the judges upon affidavit see sufficient
ground to suspect that a contempt has been committed, they either
make a rule on the suspected party to show cause why an attach-
ment should not issue against him; or, in very flagrant instances of
contempt, the attachment issues in the first instance, as it also
does if no sufficient cause be shown to discharge; and thereupon
the court confirms and makes absolute the original rule." 19
In the Cooke case the judge had received a letter from an attorney
who had lost a case before him. Four more of his cases were pending
before the same judge. The letter requested that the judge volun-
tarily disqualify himself in the remaining cases. In disparaging lan-
guage, it accused the judge of prejudice in the case already lost. The
lawyer was sentenced for contempt without notice and hearing. The
Supreme Court of the United States reversed. Justice Taft said:
"The important distinction between the Terry case and the one
at bar is that this contempt was not in open court . ,, 20
". .. Punishment without issue or trial was so contrary to the
usual and ordinarily indispensable hearing before judgment, con-
stituting due process, that the assumption that the court saw every-
thing that went on in open court was required to justify the excep-
tion. .. ,, 21
"Due process of law, therefore, in the prosecution of contempt,
except of that committed in open court, requires that the accused
should be advised of the charges and have a reasonable opportunity
18. 128 U.S. 289, 307 (1888).
19. Id. at 307-308.
20. 267 U.S. 517, 535 (1925).
21. Id.at 536.
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to meet them by way of defense or explanation. We think this
includes the assistance of counsel, if requested, and the right to call
witnesses to give testimony, relevant either to the issue of complete
exculpation or in extenuation of the offense and in mitigation of the
penalty to be imposed." 22
The language from Blackstone and the Cooke and Terry cases taken
together show that a hearing may be dispensed with only if the con-
tempt happens in the "face of the court," in such a way that the judge
"saw everything that went on" which gave him close to "perfect
knowledge" of the contemptuous behavior and of its effect to "impair
its [the court's] authority" and "obstruct the transaction of its busi-
ness." Presumably under due process, the outer limit for the reduction
of the traditional safeguards for the accused is that a hearing may be
dispensed with only when the judge's knowledge is so complete that
there is virtually no possibility that a hearing would shed any more
light on the matter. The most recent authoritative interpretation of
the Cooke and Terry cases by the Supreme Court, In re Oliver, 3 con-
firms this view. Justice Black's opinion read in part:
"The narrow exception to these due process requirements includes
only charges of misconduct, in open court, in the presence of the
judge, which disturbs the court's business, where all Qf the essential
elements of the misconduct are under the eye of the court, are actually
observed by the court. . . . If some essential elements of the offense
are not personally observed by the judge, so that he must depend upon
statements made by others for his knowledge about these essential
elements, due process requires, according to the Cooke case, that the
accused be accorded notice and afair hearing as above set out." 24
With this background of Rule 42(a) in mind, there can be little
question that the procedure it outlines cannot be followed in this case
under the first construction of the certificate. As was stated earlier,
possible out-of-court elements of the conspiracy could at best only be
inferred by the judge. They were not seen or heard by him in such a
manner that no possible proof could be produced at a hearing to show
that all or some of the defendants were innocent or deserving of lesser
punishment. Each individual defendant might show that he did not
participate in the plan or know of it, if it existed, or that he participated
to a small or lesser extent and therefore, at least, should be punished
less severely. No such problem exists where a defendant attacks a
marshal in the courtroom. There the most direct proof of guilt is
before the judge. A hearing would give the defendant no more than a
22. Id.at537.
23. 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
24. Id. at 275-76. (Emphasis supplied.)
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-chance to plea for mercy. 21 Consequently in such a case no substantial
diminution of guarantees of due process is involved. But in the present
case, the situation seems one where possible evidence contradictory
to the judge's inference might be produced at a hearing. Substantial
guarantees of due process would be denied by a more summary pro-
cedure. Rule 42(a) does not seem to go that far.
Once Rule 42(a) is understood in this light, it is clear that the funda-
mental policy it embodies cannot be overcome by the mere technical
devices suggested above. A judge who is but "constructively" present
obviously does not acquire the kind of direct and complete knowledge
that would make a hearing nothing but a formality, the elimination of
which does no substantial harm. That this strict view of Rule 42,
which precludes the "constructive" presence gloss, is in accord with
what the Supreme Court specifically intended is brought out by further
language in the Cooke opinion, set out in the notes."6 Similarly, the
notion that out-of-court behavior brought about in-court consequences
from which inferences about out-of-court conduct could properly be
made fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 42(a), since it is precisely
25. Except for the possible standard defense of insanity, which could probably also be
brought up in a collateral attack on a no-hearing conviction for contempt.
26. The federal contempt statute in part limits the power of federal courts to sentence
-for contempt, with or without a hearing, to cases where the misbehavior occurs in the
"presence of the court or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice."
18 U.S.C.R. § 401 (1950). Justice Taft in the Cooke case made it clear that while the possi-
ble broader scope of this statute may define a court's general powers to punish for con-
tempt, it is not the sole limitation where the contempt is punished without a hearing:
". .. This is fully brought out in Savin, Petitioner, 131 U.S. 267. The contempt
there was an effort to deter a witness, in attendance upon a court of the United
States in obedience to a subpoena, while he was in a waiting room for witnesses near
the courtroom, from testifying and offering him money in the hallway of the court-
house as an inducement. This was held to be 'misbehavior in the presence of the
Court' under § 725 R.S. (now § 268 of the Judicial Code). The Court, speaking by
Mr. Justice Harlan, said (page 277): 'We are of the opinion that, within the mean-
ing of the statute, the court, at least when in session, is present in every part of the
place set apart for its own use, and for the use of its officers, jurors, and witnesses;
and misbehavior anywhere in such place is misbehavior in the presence of the
court. It is true the mode of proceeding for contempt is not the same in every
case of such misbehavior. Where the contempt is committed directly under the eye
or within the view of the court, it may proceed 'upon its own knowledge of the
facts and punish the offender, without further proof, and without issue or trial in
any form,' Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 309; whereas, in cases of misbehavior of
which the judge can not have such personal knowledge, and is informed thereof
only by confession of the party, or by testimony under oath of others, the proper
practice is by rule or other process to require the offender to appear and show cause
why he should not be punished. 4 BI.Clm. 286.' This difference between the scope
of the words of the statute 'in the presence of the court,' on the one hand, and the
meaning of the narrower phrase 'under the eye or within the view of the court,' or
'in open court' or 'in the face of the court,' or 'infacie curiae,' on the other, is thus
,clearly indicated and is further elaborated in the opinion." 267 U.S. 517, 535-36
(1925).
with respect to the conduct inferred that evidence might be produced
at a hearing in defense or mitigation of punishment. In the discussion
below under the heading "Rule 42(a) and the plotter's evil purpose,"
reference will be made to further language in the Cooke opinion and
others which indicates that this is the proper interpretation of the
Rule. So too, the legal fiction of a conspiracy which recurs with every
act of its execution, as used in other contexts for different reasons,
27
would only on a preposterously formal level meet the basic policy of
the Rule. It too would fail to give the defendants a chance to present
evidence to counteract inferences from happenings in court about the
crime of which they were, in fact, accused.
(c) Rule 42(a) and the plotters' evil purpose.
There is still a further relevant significance to Rule 42(a)'s require-
ment that all the contempt must have been seen or heard by the judge.
The certificate as construed here charged as part of the conspiracy an
actual evil purpose. Such a purpose, being a state of mind, could
hardly ever be so fully seen or heard by the judge that it could be said
with any certainty that a hearing could not possibly produce some
evidence of good faith. Consequently, the Rule 42(a) procedure can-
not be applied. The discussion here will be in three parts. First, the
reader will be presented with a somewhat simplified anatomy of "in-
tent." Second, there will be a further elaboration on reasons why the
certificate should be construed as charging an actual evil intent. Third,
it will be shown that Rule 42 definitely forecloses the procedure on
situations where actual evil intent is part of the contempt.
1) Intent in criminal law is a confused concept rarely clarified and
perhaps archaic. It is beyond the scope of this article to add to the
general confusion. Here its mere skeleton will simply be borrowed to
the extent necessary for the analysis. Intent generally refers to a state
of mind, more or less accompanying the doing of an act, that needs to
27. The doctrine is not necessarily quite that broad. It is used to start the statute of
limitations over again with the commitment of every new act in furtherance of the con-
spiracy, cf. United States v. Kissel, 173 Fed. 823 (S.D. N.Y. 1909), and to prevent merger
of the substantive offense and the conspiracy charge. See Pinkerton v. United States, 328
U.S. 640 (1946).
The Supreme Court's reluctance to extend the recurring conspiracy theory to con-
tempt cases is indicated by Pendergast v. United States, 317 U.S. 412 (1943). There the
government sought to establish a contempt consisting of misrepresentation by the con-
temnor to a Federal court. The actual misrepresentation had occurred in court and met
all the requirements of "presence" contained in the federal contempt statute. But the
statute of limitations had run since that time. The government claimed that the misrepre-
sentation was part of an illegal conspiracy which continued after the particular misrepre-
sentation. The Supreme Court held the contempt prosecution barred by the statute of
limitations. It stated that the conspiracy could not be charged as the offense because it
was not committed in the presence of the court. The Court was unwilling to stretch the
"presence" requirement of the statute because the contempt was a result of the conspiracy.
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be proved before criminal liability for certain crimes or degrees of
crimes is established. Certain crimes do not involve such a mental
element at all. Others are said to require it but it is considered to be
conclusively presumed from the doing of certain acts. In those situa-
tions the mental element is of course purely fictitious. In those crimes
where some state of mind needs to be shown, its description has a wide
range. It may mean that the accused generally wanted to do some-
thing that was harmful to society or other individuals with or without
knowledge that it was either against the mores or the law. It may
mean that he simply wanted to do the specific overt act with or without
knowledge that it would do harm, was against the mores or against
the law. And it may mean that the accused wanted the act to produce
specific harms, violations of the mores or violations of the law. The
particulars of the state of mind that need be shown will depend on the
substantive law of the particular crime. Where crimes require the
showing of some state of mind among the types broadly outlined above
it may of course be inferred from circumstantial evidence. Sometimes
the burden of proof remains on the prosecution all the way. Sometimes,
once the prosecution shows a certain amount of circumstantial evidence
the burden of proof shifts to the defense to show absence of the requisite
state of mind.
2 1
Modem sophisticates might question the utility of the concept. On
one level they might feel that the law should be more objective, less
subject to standards that cannot be easily stated in concrete opera-
tional terms. Closely connected with this, they might ponder on the
impossibility of ever discovering an accused's actual state of mind,
especially at a trial. The techniques of psychoanalysis might add to
their wonder about this. Modem findings about societal cause of
crime may make the whole notion seem totally archaic, and useless
except for devising specific methods for the criminal's rehabilitation
and cure, which is an issue generally not before the judge and jury
during determinations of guilt or innocence. The authors are aware
of these considerations and do not necessarily look with disfavor upon
further reexamination of the entire concept. They feel, however, that
simply to disregard the concept in a particular case would not accom-
plish this end, but would result in denying the defendants a right to a
hearing they would otherwise have. Hereafter it will be shown that the
cases specifically point to such a right. At this point it will suffice to
say that whenever a state of mind of the type set out above is an ele-
28. See generally, Perkins, A Rationale of Mens Rea, 52 HARV. L. REV. 905 (1939);
HALL, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW chs. 5, 6, 7, 11 (1947); Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L.
REV. 9, 74 (1945); Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COL. L. REv. 55, 72-5, 78-84 (1933).
On possible unconstitutionality of statutes eliminating mens rea see Note, 24 IND. L.J. 8
(1948). On burden of proof see Campbell, Criminal Law: Mens Rea and the Burden of Proof,
22 N.Z.L.J. 161 (1946).
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ment of the crime its practical significance is that no amount of cir-
cumstantial evidence will ever conclusively foreclose the defendants
from offering to the judge or jury evidence of the absence of such state
of mind. Moreover all external evidence will be judged not against a
standard expressed in external evidence terms but against a vaguer
standard expressed in "state of mind" terms allowing much more
play to the personal feelings of the trier of facts. Here this is very
important. For, as will appear more fully below, if the Rule 42(a)
procedure' is inapplicable, it means not only that the lawyers could
introduce evidence as to their state of mind, but also that under Rule
42 (b) a new judge tries the contempt.
2) The certificate here charged the type of contempt that required
proof of a state of mind. The nature of this state of mind is more or
less described in the certificate. In part it flows from the conspiracy
charge itself. It is generally thought that there can be no conviction
for criminal conspiracy unless there is a showing of the participants'
consciously desiring to do some harm, to violate the mores or the law. 9
True there are notable exceptions and the matter is in some dispute.
But here there can hardly be any dispute in view of specific language in
the certificate and in view of the judge's remarks during the trial, of
which samples appear in the notes.30 All of these point clearly to a
charge and finding that these defendants consciously wanted to do
what they did, not simply to help their clients but to delay and ob-
struct the trial, ruin the health of the judge and so on. Conceivably
the overt acts in the courtroom themselves would have constituted a
contempt. This is how, for example, Terry's case could be regarded.
Had the certificate here simply contained the formal charge of "intent
to obstruct justice," as was true in Terry's case, it could be treated
as requiring a mental state, conclusively presumed from certain overt
29. See People v. Powell, 63 N.Y. 88 (1875). Cf. American Tobacco Co. V United
States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
30. "There has been a wilful, deliberate and concerted effort here to delay the pro-
ceedings .... At first, I couldn't think it possible, and then it began to dawn on me that
maybe that is what was going on. And I mentioned it two or three times but it did not
seem to have any effect. And finally it has come to my mind that such is the fact and I so
find .... I might just as well let you know that this dragging on, slowing down process
that I have observed and have now found to be a deliberate and concerted effort, is one of
the reasons for my rulings and will be from now on. Challenge Transcript, p. 2839.
On February 10th Judge Medina said:
"The finding made the other day was based not only upon occurrences that appear in
the minutes but what I have observed in the conduct of counsel before me here, sneering,
snickering, obvious indications of one to another to get up, it is your turn now, go at it next,
keep this thing going, and so on." Certainly, at least on this kind of reading of the mind
from gestures not directly part of the overt misconduct, rebuttal would seem to be in order.
On February 11th he said: "The effect of it all is confirming my view that there has
been this deliberate effort here to make a mockery of justice and to, in effect and in the
aggregate, sabotage the administration of justice, and I just won't have it."
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acts and therefore entirely fictitious. The question would then have
been whether Judge Medina erred in regarding the overt acts without
the mental element as contemptuous at all or as contemptuous to the
degree that called for the punishment he inflicted. But here this ques-
tion is not reached, because whether Judge Medina could have charged
the lawyers and found them guilty of contempt for doing the overt
acts alone, he did not choose to do so, but charged them instead with a
contempt which he defined as consisting of overt acts coupled with a
state of mind consisting of conscious evil design. He thus made proof
of this state of mind prerequisite to conviction; or at least relevant to
the degree of guilt.
Certain decisions, moreover, show that this view of the certificate
should probably be favored as generally more in accord with American
traditional judicial regard for the independence of the bar. True,
lawyers have from time to time behaved so badly and obstructively in
court that their very behavior, regardless of specific evil purpose, was
sufficient to support a contempt conviction.3 But it has generally been
emphasized that where the contempt consisted of activities which, no
matter how mistaken or obstructive, might have been undertaken as
part of honest if too vigorous representation of the client, then actual
evil purpose becomes a necessary part of the proof of guilt, or in any
event affects the extent of punishment. Otherwise courage and vigor
on the part of lawyers would become too hazardous and the bar's in-
dependence would be jeopardized.
This view is adequately stated in Chief Justice Fuller's opinion In re
Watts and Sachs 32 where attorneys had been held in contempt of a
bankruptcy court for giving erroneous advice that resulted in a state
court reasserting its jurisdiction over proceedings then in the federal
court:
"It is the action of the state court that was complained of, and the
essence of the alleged contempt was that, assuming that action was
taken pursuant to the advice of these attorneys, they were liable to
condemnation for giving such advice. In the ordinary case of advice
to clients, if an attorney acts in good faith and in the honest belief
that his advice is well founded and in the just interests of his client,
he cannot be held liable for error in judgment. The preservation of
the independence of the bar is too vital to the due administration
of justice to allow of the application of any other general rule.
"But here we do not have the ordinary case of advice to clients, but
the case of judicial action alleged to have been induced by the ad-
vice complained of. The theory of the condemnation is that of
conspiracy between the state court and the attorneys to obstruct
31. This was true in Terry's case. See also Jones v. United States, 151 F.2d 289 (D.C.
Cir. 1945) (person acting as attorney pro se).
32. 190 U.S. 1 (1902).
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the administration of justice and to bring the authority of the
United States Court in contempt.
"They could not be found guilty because they believed and de-
clared their belief that the state court had jurisdiction and the
District Court had not. Granting that they were mistaken it
does not follow that their mistaken conviction constituted con-
tempt.
"What evidence is there that these attorneys, or either of them,
gave any advice or took any action in bad faith, not in the honest
discharge of their duty as counsel, but with the deliberate intent to
have the Federal Court set at defiance and its orders treated with
contempt? (italics supplied)
[W]ant of intention to commit contempt is entitled to great
weight in such circumstances.
"State courts are entitled to the assistance of the gentlemen of the
bar in the maintenance of their dignity and jurisdiction, and the
fearless discharge of their duty by the latter should not be shaken
by liability to punishment for mere errors of judgment in rendering
such assistance." 33
Another good statement indicating that actual evil intent frequently
is a crucial issue in contempts by lawyers was made by the Ninth Cir-
cuit in Caldwell v. United States 34 in reversing a conviction of an attor-
ney for contempt, where the misconduct consisted of repeating ques-
tions after the judge had sustained objections.
"Undoubtedly in both questions counsel was seeking the same end,
but unless a ruling is amplified by an explanation of the reasons
therefor attorneys especially in the course of rapid cross-examina-
tion often put a question in different form, as a matter of caution,
and with no desire . . . to be contumacious. If counsel here rea-
sonably believed the subject material, it was his right, if not his
duty, to disclose specifically what he expected to show, either by an
offer of proof or by a question substantially in the form of that
asked, at the option of the court.
[O]nly in one instance, so far as we have been able to find, ..
did the court in ruling suggest that the second question was in-
tended for the same purpose, . . .and then without any admoni-
tion or direction to abstain from a like practice in the future. Thus
suddenly to punish for conduct of doubtful propriety only, where
33. Id. at 29-35.
34. 28 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1928).
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the intent to be insubordinate is not clear, might very well have
the result of deterring an attorney of less courage and experience
from doing his full duty to his client." 11
Of course in the Caldwell case the circumstantial evidence itself
did not seem to indicate an actual evil intention. In the Communist
lawyers' case, many might feel, as Judge Hand did, that such intention
could be inferred. Of course it could. But that is not enough, as the
Cooke and other cases show, to dispense with the requirements of due
process that the accused be afforded a hearing whenever actual evil
purpose is made part of the contempt. The Walts and Caldwell cases
show that where the contempt of lawyers consists of advice to clients,
cross-examination or other action, even if mistaken and disturbing,
which purports to be on behalf of a client, then the actual evil intent-
tion is a crucial element of the contempt or relevant to the degree of
guilt and consequent extent of punishment. The policy is clear: to protect
honest lawyers against punishment for excessive zeal and thus preserve
the independence of the bar.
As has been suggested, it could be argued that the overt acts men-
tioned in the certificate, although consisting largely, as Judge Clark
put it in his dissent,3" "of pressing a colloquy with'the judge-in which
the judge participated-to the point of exasperation," come closer to
those cases in which the act itself, however saintly the purpose, is
conclusive proof of guilt, than to those which require separate proof
of actual design to obstruct justice. But it is precisely on this point
that Judge Medina's conspiracy charge and explicit findings of evil
intent are significant. So too, his statement that he would not have
punished these defendants, (at least for part of the misconduct), had
it not been for the "agreement," takes on added significance. In other
words, the language of the certificate, and his courtroom remarks
referred to above, understood in the light of the general policy of mak-
ing actual evil intention an element in punishing lawyers for contempt,
point to the conclusion that the evil intention to obstruct justice was
an essential element of the lawyers' contempt or was regarded by the
judge as pertinent to the degree of guilt and thus to the severity of the
punishment.
3) And now to Rule 42(a) and the necessity for a hearing. The fol-
lowing excerpt from Justice Taft's opinion ordering a hearing in the
Cooke case tells the story.
"The court proceeded on the theory that the admission that the
petitioner had written the letter foreclosed evidence or argument.
In cases like this, where the intention with which acts of contempt
35. Ibid. See also May Hosiery Mills v. United States, 64 F.2d 450, 453 (9th Cir.
1933) and cases there cited; Sprinkle v. Davis, 111 F.2d 925,930 (4th Cir. 1940).
36. 182 F.2d 416,466 (2nd Cir. 1950).
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have been committed must necessarily and properly have an im-
portant bearing on the degree of guilt and the penalty which should
be imposed, the court cannot exclude evidence in mitigation. It is a
proper part of the defense." 11
A New York case, Matter of Rotwein, 1 in which the late Judge Leh-
man wrote the opinion, also proves instructive. The New York con-
tempt statute provides that a contempt committed "in the immediate
view and presence of the Court" may be punished without a hearing.
An attorney, while moving for a new trial, had accused the judge of
prejudice against borrowers from finance companies "possibly by
virtue of a prior connection as attorney for a finance company." The
trial judge without a hearing sentenced the attorney for contempt.
The Court of Appeals reversed. Judge Lehman's opinion read in part:
"A statement which might impair respect for the judge can hardly
constitute 'disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior' within
the meaning of the statute, if it is made by the attorney in good
faith to protect the interests of his client, and in the honest belief
that it is relevant, and without reckless disregard of the truth or
intent 'to impair the respect due to' the court. . . . Before the
Trial Judge could punish the attorney for contempt of court, he
was bound to afford an opportunity to the attorney to present
evidence which might indicate the attorney's good faith or which
might furnish justification for his statements." 11
In other words, these opinions point up the further significance of
Rule 4 2 (a)'s requirement that all the contempt must have been seen
or heard by the judge. This is a minimum substitute requirement for
the usual hearing and limits the more summary procedure to cases
where a hearing could not produce new evidence in defense. It cannot
apply where the actual state of mind, the evil intention, is part of the
contempt. Such state of mind could hardly ever be so fully before the
judge that evidence showing good faith might not be produced at a
hearing.
Judge Clark's opinion states the conclusions reached thus far suc-
cinctly and eloquently:
"Due process, however, accords a hearing to those believed to be
clearly guilty as well as to those having a good possibility of acquit-
tal. Moreover, on the issue which has become crucial-that of a
conspiracy to obstruct justice-I do not see how we can be sure.
Upon such an issue the matter of intent looms so large; indeed, the
whole question as to the difference between acts done in hot or cold
blood can hardly fail to take on a different significance in the light
of testimony, subjected to proper cross-examination, of the parties
37. 267 U.S. 517, 538 (1925).
38. 291 N.Y. 116 (1943).
39. Id. at 123-124.
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as to their purposes, and what they had agreed to in trial prepara-
tion and what was not discussed. We must bear in mind that over
and over again the charge consists of pressing a colloquy with the
judge-in which the judge participated-to the point of exaspera-
tion. I do not see how we can conclude that this was obviously all
a matter planned before the start of each colloquy. Moreover, the
issue was not alone that of the existence of the conspiracy, but also
of the participation of each in one if proven. A hearing was neces-
sary at least to settle the degrees of guilt; quite possibly it would
result in much heavier penalties to some than were actually given.
A hearing therefore seems to me a prerequisite to punishment as a
matter of law." 40
Construction 2: Conspiracy equals actual intention.
The following is one of two of Judge Hand's alternative constructions
of the preamble:
"The appellants argue that the judge punished them because he
found they were engaged in a conspiracy though he could not have
witnessed the actual making of a joint agreement. But if the ap-
pellants' conduct described in the certificate was contemptuous
and obstructive and involved contumacious acts at the trial, those
acts were committed within the judge's sight and hearing. The
judge's conclusion that they were the result of an agreement meant
no more than that they were deliberate, and it was quite unimpor-
tant whether he believed that a prior conspiracy had been entered
into. Indeed he never said that such a conspiracy had been formed.
He saw and heard the appellants deliberately delaying the trial,
disregarding his orders, and accusing him of wrong doing and
corruption. This was enough to show wilful obstruction of the
trial. There is nothing in his article indicating that there were any
acts other than those which he saw and heard that determined his
conclusions." 41
The following is his view of Specification I:
"The record appears to justify the findings in Specification I of the
Certificate that the appellants 'joined in a wilful, deliberate, and
concerted effort to delay and obstruct the trial . . . for the purpose
of causing such disorder and confusion as would prevent a verdict
by a jury on the issues raised by the indictment; and for the purpose
of bringing the Court and the entire Federal judicial system into
general discredit and disrepute. . . .' It likewise bears out the
findings of obstructive and contemptuous conduct with which the
defendants are charged in subdivisions a to m of that specification.
There seems to have been ample reason for the court's conclusion
that the attacks on Judge Knox and the other judges of the South-
40. 182 F.2d 416, 465, 466 (2nd Cir. 1950).
41. Id.at 420.
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ern District and on the jury system, the Justice Department, the
police, the newspapers and the President of the United States were
launched with a similar purpose to divert the jury from the real
issues, and to convert the case into a trial of the Government,
rather than the indicted defendants." 42
In other words, Judge Hand believes that the preamble and Specifica-
tion I do not charge or find possible out-of-court conspiracy. He
seems to construe the reference to the "agreement" in the preamble as a
finding that defendants' conduct was wilful and deliberate obstruction
of the trial. He seemingly disposes of the reference to "joined . . . in a
concerted effort" in Specification I in a similar way, without specifically
discussing the issue. Finally, he concludes that since there was ample
evidence in the record to justify the findings of wilful and deliberate
contemptuous conduct and since Judge Medina based his findings en-
tirely on what occurred in court the conviction must be upheld.
Perhaps Judge Hand's construction was simply an attempt to cor-
rect a technical slip made by an overzealous judge. Judge Medina
might have intended the conspiracy charge, yet dropped it had he
known the legal difficulties involved, and punished the defendants just
as extensively on the basis of what actually happened in court without
relying on further inference. Or Judge Medina might not have intended
to charge a conspiracy but simply used some superfluous rhetoric
which ultimately proved a little embarrassing. This kind of specula-
tion by an appellate court is unusual, to say the least, in a criminal
case involving serious charges of gross misconduct against attorneys.
And yet what other basis could Judge Hand have for treating a whole
series of special words such as "agreement entered into in a cold and
calculating manner" and "joint effort" as if they meant simply "delib-
erate and wilful"? The construction seems especially forced with
respect to the preamble where, as was shown above, at least some
weight ought to have been given to the language at the beginning that
the Judge would have overlooked misconduct resulting from mere
"heat" or "zeal" had he not "before the trial had progressed very
far . . . been reluctantly forced to the conclusion" that the con-
tumacious "acts and statements" were the "result of an agreement."
This, as has been indicated, would seem to show that the conspiracy
was an element of the misbehavior for which he actually had punished
the defendants; indeed it indicates that, with respect at least to some
of the misconduct, if not all, the judge would not have seen fit to
punish these defendants at all had it not been for the conspiracy. With
this in mind the construction of the reference to an agreement or joint
effort as meaning merely "deliberate and wilful obstruction of the
trial" seems to contradict what amounts to Judge Medina's explicit
42. Id. at 421.
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intention. In some ways it might be said to come close to a retrial of
the defendants under different charges on the appellate level.
Moreover, it seems clear that even if Judge Hand's construction is
adopted he has not succeeded in demonstrating that Rule 42(a) was
properly applied. His construction does not eliminate the explicit
language charging actual evil intent. On the contrary, though it elimi-
nates the conspiracy charge and thus also the extent to which an actual
evil intention was attributable to conspiracy alone, it converts this
charge into additional explicit allegations of evil purpose. Thus, actual
intention still seems to have remained an essential element of the crime
of which Judge Medina held the defendants guilty, or, at least relevant
thereto, affecting the degree of guilt and consequent extent of punish-
ment.43 As has been shown, due process under such circumstances
requires a hearing at which defendants are given an opportunity to
show their good faith.
Construction 3: The conspiracy as a circumstance affecting the punish-
ment.
Judge Frank decided that Specification I charged and found an
out-of-court conspiracy and that consequently the Rule 42(a)-proce-
dure was improperly applied to it. 44 He thought, however, that the
conviction could stand on the basis of the other specifications which
imposed sentences as extensive, running concurrently with those im-
posed under Specification I. In order to reach this conclusion, Judge
Frank by his own standards had to eliminate the conspiracy charge
insofar as it might be considered part of the other specifications either
on the theory that they were illustrative of Specification I, or on the
theory that they were affected by the overall charge made in the
preamble.
43. At several points in the opinion Judge Hand specifically characterizes the purpose
behind the acts of the individual defendants, thus indicating that this was part of the crime
as he understood it. Thus in 182 F.2d at 422 the opinion reads: ". . . The repeated ques-
tions appear to have involved obstructive and dilatory tactics. . . One has only to read
these and many other arguments against the judge's rulings to be convinced that the con-
duct of the appellants was concerted and wilfully obstructive." See also Judge Medina's
statements supra note 30. On p. 423, Judge Hand quotes the following statement by Judge
Medina: "observed a number of things here which have impressed me as having been done
solely for purposes of delay, perhaps to drag out their case, for an indefinite period ...
Now for example I have observed as to exhibits, that an extremely long time is taken for the
passing around of the exhibits, turning them over and over....
44. 182 F.2d 416, 455 (1950): "Specification I . . . I think charges something in the
nature of a conspiracy. . . . Although what happened in the Judge's presence was powerful
evidence of such an agreement, the agreement itself, if there was one, presumably was made
out of court; at any rate it cannot be conclusively presumed that it was made in the judge's
presence. . . . In those circumstances, the Judge, I think, could not properly sentence the
lawyers under Specification I without a hearing, at which they would have the opportunity
to offer evidence tending to show that they had not entered into a conspiracy."
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Judge Frank cryptically disposed of any connection between Specifi-
cation I and the other specifications:
"So far as these Specifications are concerned-since they all charge
acts in the court-room, seen and heard by the judge-the question
of conspiracy is wholly irrelevant, because Specification I, being
distinct and separate, cannot be read into those other Specifica-
tions." 11
Of course, it is possible that Judge Medina meant to make two
charges, the first a conspiracy to commit the overt acts, or by Judge
Hand's construction, the doing of the overt acts with actual evil pur-
pose; the second the overt acts themselves, divorced from conspiracy
or evil purpose. This interpretation, which is probably the basis of
Judg6 Frank's conclusion, does not at first glance seem improbable.
On the contrary, it seems to be quite in keeping with the organization
of the certificate under separate specifications.
Still there remains the fact that the punishment of the lawyers
under each specification which clearly seemed to charge a lesser crime
was the same as the punishment under Specification I. The fact that
McCabe whose actual participation was slight was still punished quite
heavily, and that Dennis, a nonlawyer, was given a severe penalty,
supports the notion that they were treated as co-conspirators. 46 More-
over, the preamble seems to connect everything to the conspiracy with
its actual evil intent. Therein there is also the intimation that at least
some of the overt acts would not have been punished were it not for
the agreement. Judge Frank's view of the relation between Specifica-
tion I and the other specifications makes the rest of these specifications
somewhat inconsistent with the preamble.
Even the elimination of any connection between Specification I and
the rest of the specifications, does not of course remove the direct effect
of the preamble on those specifications. Its position in the certificate
would suggest that its characterization of the contempts referred to all
the specifications in the certificate. Judge Frank did not adopt Judge
Hand's first alternative construction of the preamble which was dis-
cussed above; instead, he adopted Judge Hand's second alternative.
Judge Hand stated:
"Even if . . . [the judge] . . .regarded the appellants' conduct
as the result of an agreement made outside the courtroom, that
view is unimportant and would not limit his power to impose a
summary punishment for contempt. His punishment could no
more be revised because he held that view than could a sentence for
an ordinary crime be reversed because the judge felt and said that a
defendant had shown himself such an undesirable citizen in other
45. 182 F.2d 416, 455 (1950).
46. See note 14 supra.
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transactions as to merit the imposition of unusually severe treat-
ment. His reason for the length of the sentence would not affect
its validity and should be ignored on appeal." 4
Judge Frank's version was as follows:
"Nor, I think, was the conspiracy charge imported into them by
the trial judge's preliminary remarks. For I agree with Judge Hand
that we should ignore those remarks as superfluous, since they are
but the equivalent of the action of a trial judge who (after a defend-
ant has been properly held guilty) fixes a long sentence-within the
permitted statutory limits-due to his belief that the defendant,
out of court and without reference to the case on trial, had mis-
behaved. It has been held that such a belief has no bearing on the
propriety of the sentence itself." 18
For Judge Frank, this view was especially peculiar because he
held that in Specification I the Judge charged the outside conspiracy
as one of the contempts. Yet in the preamble what seemed to be even
more explicit language became simply a circumstance of the punish-
ment. Such a construction of the conspiracy, as merely a circum-
stance affecting the extent of punishment regardless of the ques-
tion of guilt or innocence, seems inconsistent with the final sentence of
the preamble: "A ccordingly, I adjudge the following guilty of the several
criminal contempts described below." This statement tends to indicate
that Judge Medina regarded the agreement charged in the preamble as
affecting the question of guilt or innocence, or at least of degree of
guilt. Again here the earlier statement, that were it not for the con-
spiracy, conduct resulting from the "heat of controversy" and "zeal
in the defense" would have been overlooked, would tend to indicate
that the conspiracy charge or at least actual evil purpose was in the
trial judge's mind an essential element of the offense--or offenses-or,
alternatively, relevant to the degree of their guilt.
Even had the Judge's certificate stated in so many words that the
conspiracy was merely an element pertinent to the extent of punish-
ment and not relevant to the question of guilt or innocence there would
be grave doubt about the validity of the procedure. The general trend
and philosophy in the United States to limit strictly the contempt
power of the courts has already been mentioned. It would be a weak
principle, indeed, if it could so easily be circumvented. Punishment
without hearing and notice of misbehavior in court which might ordi-
narily be punished by a small fine, could be blown up beyond all con-
ceivable proportions by linking it with out-of-court behavior which
otherwise would require a hearing, under the pretext that the out-of-
court behavior was merely a circumstance affecting the punishment.
47. 182 F.2d 416, 420-421 (1950).
48. Id. at 455-456.
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But there are more serious doubts about the analogy with which
Judges Hand and Frank so cavalierly made so large a hole in the dyke
constructed as a safeguard against judicial tyranny. The cases alluded
to by Judge Hand and cited by Judge Frank deal with procedures under
which the judge in a criminal case is given a great deal of discretion in
fixing punishment, regardless of the degree of guilt of the accused in
the particular case. As was clearly pointed out in Williams v. New
York, 4 ' cited by Judge Frank, the modern justification for criminal
statutes giving such discretion to the judge is that treatment of the
criminal should be geared to the individual characteristics of the of-
fender. The incurable should be segregated as long as possible so that
he may do no further harm to society, but the curable should, if possi-
ble, be given the kind of treatment, within the limits of the institutions
available, which would be most likely to rehabilitate him. Conse-
quently, the enlightened judge before sentencing takes into considera-
tion the offender's home environment, psychological characteristics,
his criminal record and other factors, to help him form a picture of the
personality of the offender. 10
All of this is of little relevance to the contempt procedure at issue in
the Foley Square case. The procedure to punish for contempts without
notice and hearing is not designed to deal with segregation and cure of
criminals. Its only object is to give the judge a weapon to assure day
to day uninterrupted orderly judicial administration. On-the-spot
immediate punishment is an emergency measure, designed to restrain
the offender from continuing and to deter him and others immediately
from further offenses disrupting the administration of justice. The
49. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
50. Justice Black's opinion in part reads as follows:
" . . Today's philosophy of individualizing sentences makes sharp distinctions for
example between first and repeated offenders. Indeterminate sentences the ulti-
mate termination of which are sometimes decided by non-judicial agencies have to
a large extent taken the place of the old rigidly fixed punishments. The practice of
probation which relies heavily on non-judicial implementation has been accepted
as a wise policy. Execution of the United States parole system rests on the discre-
tion of an administrative parole board. 36 Stat. 918, 18 U.S.C. §§ 714, 716, now
§§ 4202, 4203. Retribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law.
Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders have become important goals of crim-
inal jurisprudence.
"Modern changes in the treatment of offenders make it more necessary now
than a century ago for observance of the distinctions in the evidential procedure in
the trial and sentencing processes. For indeterminate sentences and probation have
resulted in an increase in the discretionary powers exercised in fixing punishments.
In general, these modern changes have not resulted in making the lot of offenders
harder. On the contrary a strong motivating force for the changes has been the
belief that by careful study of the lives and personalities of convicted offenders
many could be less severely punished and restored sooner to complete freedom and
useful citizenship." Id. at 248-9 (Footnotes omitted).
Except for the older cases, which simply accepted discretion in the Court without much
analysis, the other cases cited by Judge Frank move toward the rationale of the Williams
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problems of long-range rehabilitation, cure and segregation of criminals
are generally not involved. In any event, the relevance of these issues
to the punishment of lawyers who, up to the point where they allegedly
committed the contempt, appeared to have been accredited members
of the bar, seems hard to understand.
This difference is also reflected in the kind of material involved in
the cases Judges Hand and Frank used to support their view. It must
be background material, designed to enable the judge to fix more or
less scientifically the exact sentence within broader limits which have
been determined by considerations of degree of guilt. The substance
of the alleged conspiracy is not such as to throw much light on the
underlying personalities of these lawyers. 51 And if the conspiracy is
taken to have been inferred entirely from what happened in the court-
room, as Judge Hand strongly intimates, it tends to lose more of the
aspects of scientific background material and takes on rather the
characteristics of a bootstrap by which a trial judge justified the extent
of retribution meted out to the offenders.
Moreover, Justice Taft's opinion in the Cooke case seems to foreclose
circumvention of the requirement for a hearing in contempt proceed-
ings on the ground that such material is personality background to
enable the judge to help fix the sentence:
"Due process of law in the prosecution of contempt, ... includes
. . . the right to call witnesses . . . relevant either to the issue of
complete exculpation or in extenuation of the offense or in. mitigation
of the penalty to be imposed." 52
THE SECOND CONTENTION: THE NECESSITY FOR SPEEDY PUNISHMENT
AS A MINIMUM REQUIREMENT OF DUE PROCESS
Especially, once it is assumed, as it was by the Court of Appeals,
that the trial judge did not punish the lawyers for a continuing con-
spiracy that concluded at the end of the trial, the punishment without
case. It should also be pointed out that most of the cases involved verdicts, so that the
function of finding guilt and innocence and the function of determining the extent of the
sentence rested in different individuals.
51. This could be looked at in still another way. The conspiracy and evil intent is the
type of evidence that could easily be made relevant to the degree of guilt in some charge of
contempt. Thus, if the certificate really charged the conspiracy it is clear that evidence
concerning it is relevant to a finding of guilt. Does the Williams case really go so far as to
permit elimination of a full hearing and cross-examination on this evidence by permitting
the certificate to be drawn to exclude conspiracy as an element of the contempt, while al-
lowing its consideration as outside circumstance permitting the fixing of a sentence as high
as would have been fixed had the conspiracy been made an element of the contempt? In
other words suppose the maximum sentence permitted for first degree murder and second
degree murder is the same. Could a defendant be tried for second degree murder and the
judge be allowed to consider premeditation as an outsidc. circumstance permitting him to
impose the maximum sentence?
52. 267 U.S. 517, 537 (1925) (Emphasis supplied). There seems to be no qualification
that this refers only to the extent that the penalty depends on degrees of guilt.
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a hearing is open to further question. The judge did not punish the
lawyers on the spot when they committed the contempt but instead
postponed their conviction, apparently as a matter of deliberate policy,
until the very end of the trial. It will be recalled that he stated in the
preamble that "to have done otherwise would inevitably have broken
up the trial and thus served the ends which defendants tried so hard
to obtain." The lawyers' contention amounted to this: When there is
such deliberate delay, punishment without a hearing is improper be-
cause the extraordinary power to punish in this way is designed for
cases where immediate punishment only would stop the disruption of
the trial and assure uninterrupted further administration of justice.
The punishment, they contended, must follow instantly upon the
committing of the contempt. At any rate, it could not be delayed till
the very end of the trial where speedy punishment could have no
possible bearing on the need for continuing the proceeding. The argu-
ment in terms of our analysis is somewhat as follows:
In weighing the need for orderly administration of justice against
the policy of preserving safeguards for the accused, the elimination of
the safeguard of a hearing is so drastic a step that it is justified only by
an emergency making the elimination of the hearing absolutely neces-
sary to continued judicial administration. The one factor involved in
the elimination of a hearing that has a direct relation to such absolute
necessity is speed. Other results, as for example, that possible future
offenders might be deterred because such forceful procedure will ccn-
stitute greater punishment, must be achieved by other means, for
example, by inflicting longer sentences or imposing heavier fines. To
be sure, the occasion might arise when either immediate conviction
with postponed punishment or immediate conviction and immediate
punishment might be required to shock the offender, and perhaps his
cohorts, into submission. A mere warning might not suffice. The
interruption might continue or be repeated. Even the direct applica-
tion of force, such as the marshal ordering or even pushing the offensive
person back into his seat, might be resisted were it not for the psy-
chological effect of the instant conviction and in some cases immediate
punishment. But where a warning would suffice, or where immediate
conviction or instant conviction and punishment would have the effect
of further disturbing the proceedings and delay until a later time is
deemed advisable as a means of avoiding such disturbance, no necessity
for doing away with a hearing exists and conviction and punishment
without a hearing is improper.
The question of "necessity," of course, is not a question of black or
white. On the contrary, it is a complex criterion the application of
which involves consideration of a number of factors. It must be under-
stood as a pragmatic standard. To be sure, the judge might be able to
stagger through a trial by having a recalcitrant lawyer strapped to the
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chair with a gag over his mouth except when the judge is willing to let
him speak. Practical necessity, obviously, does not require resort to
such fantastic alternatives. The court's judgment as to when summary
procedure is necessary must rest on many considerations, including his
estimate of the potential contemnors' sense of professional ethics,
taste, sincerity, amenability to milder disciplinary measures and the
courtroom mores of the community, to mention but a few. "Necessity"
to punish for contempt by summary procedure is a relative term and
is to be interpreted in the light of the reasonable use of the alternative
means at hand and a reasonable anticipation of their effect to insure
orderly judicial administration.
(a) Legal Basis of the Need for Speed
The Oliver, Cooke, and Terry opinions give support to the contention
that the necessity which requires the elimination of notice and hearing
is the need for speed of conviction and punishment.
Justice Taft stated in the Cooke case:
"We think the distinction finds its reason not any more in the abil-
ity of the judge to see and hear what happens in the open court
than in the danger that, unless such an open threat to the orderly
procedure of the court and such a flagrant defiance of the person and
presence of the judge before the public in the 'very hallowed place
of justice' as Blackstone has it, is not instantly suppressed and pun-
ished, demoralization of the court's authority will follow. . . .The
need for immediate penal vindication of the dignity of the court
created it." 13
Justice Black in the Oliver case quoted this portion of the Cooke
opinion on this point as follows:
"Furthermore, the Court explained the Terry rule as reaching only
such conduct as created 'an open threat to the orderly procedure
of the court' and such a flagrant defiance of the person and presence
of the judge before the public 'that, if not instantly suppressed and
punished, demoralization of the court's authority will follow.' " 54
He then goes on to say:
"The narrow exception to these due process requirements includes
only charges of misconduct, in open court. . . .where immediate
punishment is essential to prevent 'demoralization of the court's
authority' before the public." 15
He characterized the Terry rule as based on the belief "that a court's
business could not be conducted unless it could suppress disturbance
within the courtroom by immediate punishment." 16
53. Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 536 (1925). (Emphasis supplied).
54. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 275 (1948). (Emphasis supplied).
55. Id. at 275 (Emphasis supplied).
56. Id. at 274 (Emphasis supplied).
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Judges Hand and Frank did not believe that the cases permitted the
non-hearing procedure only where instant or speedy conviction and
punishment was required. Since this phase of their opinion rests to a
large extent on an analysis of the Terry case, a fuller statement of that
case is here set out:
Terry, an attorney, in attempting to resist a court order expelling his
wife proceeded to beat the marshal and assault him with a deadly
weapon. Thereafter he voluntarily left the courtroom and with a
drawn knife forced his way into another room in the same building
then occupied by the marshal and in which Terry's wife was being
held. Terry's contempt had interrupted Judge Field's reading of his
opinion. After the interruption Judge Field proceeded with the opin-
ion. Then an order was made finding Terry guilty of contempt and
containing directions for his imprisonment. A petition for habeas
corpus was based on the following grounds:
"1. That the order was made in his [Terry's] absence; 2. That it was
made without his having had any previous notice of the intention of
the court or taking any steps whatever in relation to the matters
referred to in the order; 3. That it was made without giving him any
opportunity of being first heard in defense of the charges therein made
against him." 17 Grounds 2 and 3 generally raised the question that
has been discussed here whether the contempt was of the type that
could be punished without notice and hearing. The court did not have
occasion to rule directly on whether delayed conviction and punish-
ment could ever be had without a hearing. But in holding the no-
hearing procedure legal in Terry's case, it consistently assumed that
this procedure occurs only where there is a need for instant conviction
and punishment.
"It results from what has been said that it was competent for the
Circuit Court, immediately upon the commission, in its presence, of
the contempt recited in the order of September 3, to proceed upon
its own knowledge of the facts, and punish the offender, without
further proof, and without issue or trial in any form. It was not
bound to hear any explanation of his motives, if it was satisfied,
and we must conclusively presume, from the record before us, that it
was satisfied, from what occurred under its own eye and within its
hearing, that the ends of justice demanded immediate action, and
that no explanation could mitigate his offence or disprove the fact
that he had committed such contempt of its authority and dignity
as deserved instant punishment." 59
57. .Ex parle Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 306 (1888).
58. Id. at 309, 310 (Emphasis supplied). The conclusive presumption in favor of the
findings that showed the necessity for the summary action is due to the fact that this case
came to the court by original petition for habeas corpus on which the scope of review was
limited to question of "jurisdiction." "As the writ of habeas corpus does not perform the
office of a writ of error or an appeal, these facts cannot be reexamined and questioned in
this collateral proceeding." Id. at 305.
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"It was within the discretion of that [trial] court, whose dignity he
[Terry] had insulted, and whose authority he has openly defied, to
determine whether it should, upon its own view of what occurred,
proceed at once to punish him, or postpone action until he was ar-
rested upon process, brought back into its presence, and permitted
io make defense."
Ground 1 raised the further question of whether the court did not
lose jurisdiction over the person to punish Terry after he had left the
courtroom. The Supreme Court held that the Circuit Court did not
lose jurisdiction in this case because the order of commitment was so
immediate that it "took place, substantially, on the same occasion, and
constituted, in legal effect, one continuous complete transaction,
occurring on the same day, and at the same session of the court. The
jurisdiction, therefore, of the Circuit Court to enter an order for the
offender's arrest and imprisonment was as full and complete as when
he was in the courtroom in the immediate presence of the judges." 60
The Court left open one question:
"Whether the Circuit Court would have had the power at a subse-
quent term, or at a subsequent day of the same term, to order his
arrest and imprisonment for the contempt, without first causing
him to be brought into its presence, or without making reasonable
efforts by rule or attachment to bring him into court, and giving
him an opportunity to be heard before being fined and imprisoned,
is a question not necessary to be considered on the present hear-
ing." 61
Judge Hand's opinion starts with the notion that this question left
open in Terry's case was the issue he was considering in the Foley
Square case:
"We now reach the appellants' second objection based on 'their
contention that the judge could only impose summary punishment
immediately upon the commission of their acts of contempt. The
validity of such an objection was left open in Ex parte Terry, 128
U.S. at 314. . . . It has expressly left open the question whether,
where a judge has power to punish without notice and in open court,
he must impose sentence immediately after the contempt is com-
mitted. This is the question before us." 62
59. Id. at 313.
60. Id. at 314.
61. Ibid.
62. United States v. Sacher, 182 F.2d 416, 428, 429 (2nd Cir. 1950). The judge after
citing Terry's case also rqferred to Pendergast v. United States, 317 U.S. 412, 419. The
Court there stated: "Ex parte Terry . . . sanctioned summary punishment for 'direct
contempts' committed in the 'presence' of the court. The question whether that procedure
could be followed 'at a subsequent term, or at a subsequent day of the same term' was
especially reserved." There is nothing in the discussion of Terry's case which follows that
requires a different characterization of the question left open. It should be noted that
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Judge Hand's statement is not literally correct, for the Supreme
Court left open "expressly" only a question concerned with the prob-
lems involved in Ground 1 of the petition for habeas corpus. The
question there raised was generally whether Terry could be ordered
committed in his absence, and in answering this question in the affirma-
tive as far as Terry's case was concerned, the Court left open the
question of whether in another case where the delay was to the next
day or the next term the court could still retain personal jurisdiction
without first bringing the accused into its presence and granting him a
hearing. This question of power to order punishment of the accused in
his absence was not the question before the Court in the Foley Square
case. The issue in that case was the one raised by Grounds 2 and 3 of
the petition in the Terry case-whether the accused could be convicted
and punished without notice and hearing. The specific issue of the
effect of delayed conviction and punishment and the requirement of
notice and hearing was not the question left open in Terry's case. It
never was directly before the court because the conviction was con-
sidered immediate. Indeed, the court seemed to assume throughout
that it was the need for such immediate conviction and punishment
that justified the no-hearing procedure. In its discussion, the court
consistently linked denial of a hearing with immediate conviction and
punishment without indicating that deliberately delayed conviction
and punishment without a hearing might be legal. Of course, this is
not a holding that delay would make conviction and punishment with-
out a hearing improper, but it contradicts the notion that this question
was "expressly" left open in Terry's case.
Still, Judge Hand may have a point. If conviction or punishment
could never take place at a subsequent day or term without a hearing,
the question of the necessity of reacquiring jurisdiction over the person
would be settled. For then the accused would have to be brought before
the judge for the required hearings and the court would thus clearly
reacquire personal jurisdiction. So by the very fact that the juris-
dictional question is left open, it seems that the question of conviction
and punishment on a subsequent date without a hearing is also left
open. But even this does not necessarily support Judge Hand's posi-
tion. For it need not follow that the portions of the opinion in Terry's
case, which link the no-hearing procedure with immediate conviction
and punishment, are to be ignored. Such statements still tend to in-
dicate that a hearing may be omitted only when speedy conviction and
Judge Hand was incorrect in stating that the question was left open "again in Pendergast
v. United States. . . ." The Pendergast case at most can be said to involve authoritative
discussion of Terry's case, not an explicit reservation of decision on the question by the
court, for the court explicitly went on to say: "That is a procedural problem peculiar to
direct contempts in the face of the court . . . and obviously has no relevancy to the prob-
lem of the Statute of Limitations."
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punishment is required to subdue an offender and thus assure orderly
administration of justice. If this is the case at the time the contempt is
committed, it may also be the case where the offender escapes but is
later apprehended under a warrant. He may still be too obstreperous
and dangerous for the courtroom. There might be express threats or
generally known indications that associates or fellow conspirators
would come to his aid. 63 Immediate conviction and punishment for the
original contempt might be regarded as necessary to prevent further
contemptuous conduct and thus assure the continued orderly adminis-
tration of justice. From this point of view, the question left open by
the Supreme Court, in so far as it involved the no-hearing procedure,
was simply this: if at the time of apprehension on a subsequent day or a
subsequent term, there still exists a necessity for an immediate convic-
tion and punishment of an earlier contempt, may the court proceed
without a hearing? Or must the court give a hearing as to the earlier
offense and handle the emergency by immediate punishment of the
new contempts if they occur? 64 On this point, the Supreme Court
would not commit itself.
But this was not the question involved in the Foley Square case.
There, there was no showing or claim that immediate conviction and
punishment was needed to assure preservation of the continued ad-
ministration of justice at the time the offenses (if they are treated as
separate offenses) were committed. There was no impossibility, such
as the offenders' absenting themselves from the court, that prevented
the judge from proceeding immediately against them. On the con-
trary, their conviction and punishment was delayed because the judge
thought, as the certificate indicates, that such a procedure would dis-
rupt rather than assure the continued orderly administration of justice.
He must have felt that his threats and warnings would enable him to
keep the trial going, perhaps not in an ideal way, but at least in a
feasible way. As it turned out, of course, his prediction was correct.
When, almost at the end of the proceedings, the lawyers were without a
hearing convicted for their earlier offenses, there was again no showing
or claim that they were at that time behaving in such a way that the
subduing effect of immediate conviction and punishment was required.
Thus, throughout the proceedings, none of the elements that would
bring into play the question left open in the Terry case was involved
in the Foley Square case. 65 Under such circumstances, the first part
63. This would raise the question of to what extent the Judge can take evidence not
before him into consideration to determine that there is a need for speed.
64. It should be noted that in a sense this would force the court to use additional pun-
ishment where one punishment instantly imposed might suffice. It would still deprive him
of a hearing for the new punishment, which would be the price he would pay to get a hearing
for the old. In such a situation it would be difficult to say which procedure would be more
in accord with due process.
65. For further remarks on this point see notes 69 and 80 infra.
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of the Terry opinion indicates a hearing is required and the question
left open implies nothing to the contrary.
The "question left open" can be looked at in still another way.
WVhere the offender escapes instant punishment by flight, should he
benefit by that fact and be granted a hearing? Perhaps not. Still, this
is not the question involved in the Foley Square case. For there it was
the fact that the offenders were attorneys, not their further contempts
which made the delay of their conviction and punishment especially
in keeping with the necessities of justice.
Of course, Judge Hand's entire argument about the question left open
in Terry's case does not meet the argument that the Cooke and Oliver
cases seem to interpret the Terry case as linking the no-hearing pro-
cedure with the need for speed. Yet about the Oliver case all Judge
Hand says is: "Nor do we think that the language of the Supreme Court
in In re Oliver . . . contemplates the limitation which appellants'
counsel contend for." 11 This remark is preceded by a statement to the
effect that Justice Taft in the Cooke case in speaking of " 'immediate
penal vindication of the dignity of the court' " meant "as speedy
vindication as was practicable under the circumstances, and could not
have required steps which would have broken up the trial or frustrated
the powers of the judge to vindicate his authority after it had been
flouted in open court." 67 Of course Justice Taft did not mean to force
the judge to break up the trial. But it is obvious that a hearing in the
Foley Square case at the end of the proceedings would not break up the
proceedings. Even more severe procedures during the trial would have
been possible if needed without necessarily breaking the trial up. On
the other hand, if these attorneys had wanted to break up the trial
at any cost, they could, for example, have insisted on throwing ink-
wells at the judge in the middle of the trial, and no procedure would
have assured the trial's continuation. 6
Judge Frank, too, tried to dispose of the significant language of the
Cooke and Oliver cases, 9 About the Cooke case he said no more than:
"The Cooke case related to out-of-court contempt." 70 And so it did,
but in discussing out-of-court contempt, the Supreme Court dis-
66. United States v. Sacher, 182 F.2d 416,429 (2nd Cir. 1950).
67. Id. at 429.
68. For further remarks on this point see page 45 infra.
69. Judge Frank thought that the question left open in Terry's case was probably not
involved in the Foley Square case: "Whether the question is present in this case may be
doubted. If it were, I think the Supreme Court would answer that the judge retained juris-
diction of the person of the several lawyers. For, although they left the courtroom after
committing the contempts, they voluntarily returned, in connection with their obligations
to their clients, in the same case, so that, in that manner and fbr that purpose, the lawyers
were present in the court when the judge charged and sentenced them." United States v.
Sacher, 182 F.2d 416, 461 (2nd Cir. 1950).
70. Id. at 462.
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tinguished it from contempt in the face of the court and stated that
the procedure sanctioned in the Terry case was there permitted because
there was a danger to the continued administration of justice unless the
offense was instantly punished. To be sure, the Cooke case is not a
holding on the point but it is an authoritative interpretation of the
Terry case and can hardly be brushed aside so lightheartedly. Again
the Oliver case is distinguished by Judge Frank in part 7 on the ground
that it involved conviction of the contemnor without a hearing on the
basis of evidence by witnesses who testified in the contemnor's ab-
sence. The major reason for the reversal of tlie conviction was that
this was not a contempt seen and heard by the judge. 72 But the fact
that this was the major point of the case does not make utterly mean-
ingless the court's discussion of Terry's case as an instance where imme-
diate punishment was needed to prevent the demoralization of the
court's authority.
(b) Retribution and Deterrence of Future Offenders in Future Cases.
Having eliminated the notion that the Terry case and others showed
that only the necessity for speed justified the no-hearing procedure,
Judge Hand then attacked the view that it is the only function of con-
viction and punishment without a hearing to prevent misconduct or
deter interruption of the immediate proceedings.
".. . No summary punishment can prevent obstructive acts al-
ready completed inasmuch as it must follow them. . . . In the
Terry case the misconduct was complete and the particular case was
over, so that summary punishment was not necessary to enable
the court 'to go on with' its work, yet it was imposed." 73
What then is the justification for the admitted extraordinary no-
hearing procedure? Judge Hand puts it this way:
"We are in no way indicating that a lax, importunate exercise of it
ought to be sanctioned. We merely hold that the acts of these
appellants are intolerably obstructive to an orderly trial and -mer-
ited a summary punishment. . .. ," 74
The underscored word is the important one. For if the no-hearing
contempt proceeding is not designed simply to prevent or deter dis-
ruption of the immediate proceedings then the word "merited" suggests
that elimination of a hearing is an additional punishment inflicted on
the defendants for their intolerable behavior either as sheer retribution
or in order to deter the defendants or like offenders at some future
71. For a further distinction of the Oliver case see page 39 infra.
72. United States v. Sacher, 182 F.2d 416, 462 (2nd Cir. 1950).
73. Id. at 429.
74. Ibid.
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occasion. It serves somewhat the same function as a higher fine or
longer period of imprisonment at the end of a contempt hearing would
serve.
Judge Frank in his opinion makes these points very explicit. At the
very outset he states:
".. . They tried to throw a wrench in the machinery of justice.
Whatever may have been their purpose, their acts might have
made a trial of their clients impossible. Not to punish such be-
havior summarily, but, instead, to require a long trial of these
lawyers, might well be to encourage that sort of behavior. The
summary punishment here will tend to deter imitation of that
behavior in other trials. . . . We affirm for the plain reason that
the crude antics of these lawyers, if copied by lawyers in other
cases, would almost surely disrupt trials." 71
Although Judge Frank then briefly goes on to state that the "gravity
of the lawyers' misbehavior does not settle the question whether pun-
ishment by summary procedure was legally permissible," 76 he quickly
returns to this point in his discussion of the legality of delayed convic-
tion and punishment without a hearing. First he states that "the ex-
ceptional power to punish summarily cannot be founded on the ability
to forestall the punished behavior . . . since its effect is wholly
prospective. . .. ," 17 He concluded that therefore it must be justified
solely by the fact that "it will tend to prevent future misconduct-
either (1) in the future course of the same case or (2) in other future
cases." I, He stresses especially the function of deterring misconduct
in future cases and makes up his own horror story of what the conse-
quences might be if this were not conceded to be a legitimate role of
the non-hearing procedure: Suppose a criminal case was fully over and
"while the judge was waiting, in open court for another case to be
called, someone in the courtroom shouting that the judge was a tyrant
threw an inkwell at him." If one took seriously the notion that future
case deterring effect was not a legitimate function of the no-hearing
procedure the court would have to give the inkwell thrower a hearing
before another judge "because the offense could not possibly disturb
any case pending before the court." 71 Judge Frank then turns to
Terry's case and stresses the point made by Judge Hand that the judge
there did not order the commitment of Terry till the case was over. He
draws the conclusion that "if, then, an exclusively in-future-cases-
deterring effect does not suffice to sustain a summary contempt pro-
75. Id. at 454.
76. Id. at 455.
77. Id. at 456.
78. Ibid.
79. Id. at 457. See note 85 infra.
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ceeding, Terry's case was wrongly decided." 50 He even draws support
from the following sentence in the opinion in In re Oliver, which in-
volved a contempt in a secret one-man grand jury proceeding: " 'Since
the petitioner's alleged misconduct all occurred in secret, there could
be no possibility of a demoralization of the court's authority before
the public.' " S This, Judge Frank felt, showed that summary punish-
ment is justified where the public nature of the trial might encourage
others to imitate the offenders at some future time. To the argument
that demoralization "represents the rationale for punishment, not for
the method by which it is imposed," he replies that the court in Oliver's
case held that, "because there was no demoralization of the court's
authority 'before the public,' summary punishment-but, by no means,
every other form of punishment for contempt-was improper." 32 It
seems clear that in Judge Frank's view the no-hearing procedure is
part of the punishment imposed for a serious contempt committed in
public. The possibility that a grave contempt in public will breed
future misbehavior unless severely dealt with justifies the elimination
of a hearing. This is as much part of the punishment and varies as
much with the gravity of the offense (once it is committed in public)
as would a heavier fine or longer jail sentence.
Judge Frank's concluding remarks on this phase of his opinion
leave little doubt that this is what he had in mind:
"Criminologists disagree concerning the extent to which punishing
one man deters other men. But there is general agreement that, in
some instances at least, punishment acts both directly, as a pre-
ventative example to others, and indirectly as a means of creating
or strengthening social habits of conduct. There can be little doubt
that summary punishment of contempt in a case like this, will have
both effects." 8
80. Id. at 457-58. Judge Frank first stresses the fact that in Terry's case the improper
conduct was not immediately punished. "The presiding judge resumed his reading of the
court's opinion. When he finished that reading that case terminated. Only then did the
court cite and summarily sentence Terry for contempt." He then states: "It is said, in an
attempted distinction of Terry's case, that there the delay was short while here it was
long." And it finally turns out that he makes nothing new of the point: "I fail to under-
stand how the shortness, in Terry's case of the interval between misconduct and punish-
ment can support the in-the-very-samb case argument. For that shortness cannot alter the
basic fact that in Terry's case the summary punishment could not . .. prevent anyone
from interfering with .. . the very case." That is the same point about the occurrence of
the punishment at the end of the trial, which does not depend upon whether there is a delay
or not. One fails to see then why Judge Frank stresses the delay in Terry's case. Moreover,
as was seen, see page 33 supra, the court in Terry's case treated the slight delay as minimal.
This might provide an argument in a case where there is slight delay, but it does not negate
the general principle of permitting the no-hearing procedure only where there is need for
speed and helps not at all where the delay was as long as in the Foley Sguare case.
81. Id. at 458.
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid.
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All this array of legal and policy considerations brought forth by
Judges Hand and Frank, on analysis, seems to have little sound founda-
tion and to carry with it hazards which are startling to say the least.
First, the argument seems to be that because conviction and punish-
ment can never prevent the crime for which it is imposed and since
Terry was actually convicted at the end of the trial, the no-hearing
procedure must have among its legitimate justifications the deterring
of future offenders in future cases. But although conviction and punish-
ment cannot prevent the crime that has occurred, its deterrent effect
may be to stop the same offender from continuing his present activities
at the present time, not at some future time. Similarly, although in
Terry's case the trial was over, it would seem that immediate convic-
tion and punishment might have been of great aid in subduing Terry,
whose continued absence indicated that he was still in the process of
disrupting the orderly administration of justice. Indeed the Supreme
Court stated that "his departure, without making some apology for,
or explanation of, his conduct, might justly be held to aggravate his
offense, and to make it plain that consistently with the public interests,
there should be no delay, upon the part of the court, in exerting its
power to punish." S4 The fact that speed may be required, as in Terry's
case or as in Judge Frank's inkwell thrower's case, to arrest a continued
threat to the judge's opening or conduct of the next case does not mean
that the no-hearing procedure can be justified as a specific punishment
to deter not only the same offender but all like-minded future offenders
in future cases. Neither the facts in Terry's case nor Judge Frank's
inkwell case require such a sweeping conclusion. All they illustrate is
that no oversimplified mechanical rule, such as one which would permit
summary procedure only to prevent disruption of the same case, is
workable. But they do not show that the no-hearing procedure can be
used, where the need for speed to assure continued orderly judicial
administration does not exist at all. Thus, if there had been any show-
ing or even claim in the Foley Square case that the offenders were still
engaged in offensive behavior or threatening the continued adminis-
tration of justice at the time of their convictions, the no-hearing pro-
cedure would no doubt have been justified. But this was not the case.8 5
84. Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 311 (1888).
85. Judge Frank's error stems from his setting up the lawyers' arguments in two al-
ternative forms, as part of an analysis to "expose its fallacies." First: Delay is bad if it is
to the end of the case, because summary punishment is designed only to deter offenses in
the same case. His inkwell thrower's case is designed to meet this argument. He even
goes so far as to point out that the argument doesn't apply to the Foley Square case because
the case wasn't over. Motions for a new trial and arrest of judgment were argued a week
later. Second: The no-hearing procedure may not occur if there is any postponement at all
"even when the delay is not until thw case's end." (Italics supplied.) United States v. Sacher,
182 F.2d 416, 459 (2nd Cir. 1950). In meeting this portion of the argument he never bothers
to return to the inkwell thrower's case, probably because the "even when the delay is not
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Judge Frank's argument from the Oliver case, though a possible
interpretation of the language in that case, seems not to be a plausible
one. Here Judge Frank chooses to ignore the other language in Oliver's
case, which links the no-hearing procedure with instant or immediate
conviction and punishment. Had he taken that language fully into
consideration, and read the statement about "demoralization of the
court's authority" in its context it should have been clear that what
the Court was saying was not that the no-hearing procedure is designed
to deter others from disrupting future trials, but rather that speed is
especially necessary when the proceeding is a public one because if a
court does not quickly manage to restore order, its institutional effec-
tiveness will be impaired or destroyed. Where the proceeding is secret,
the court has somewhat more leeway and can take more time in its
attempts to restore order before there would be any dangerous effect
on the public. There is no suggestion whatsoever that the no-hearing
procedure may be used where the proceedings are public and order
can be restored without speedy conviction and punishment. The pub-
lic or secret nature of the proceedings serves simply as an index of the
need for speed and is not independently determinative of the legality
of the no-hearing procedure.
Finally, and most important, the policy behind Judges Hand's and
Frank's reasoning is extremely dangerous to fair judicial procedure in
American courts. For once the elimination of notice and hearing is
made part of the punishment, it follows that the more serious the
offense one is accused of, the less likely is the chance of a hearing at
which he can defend himself. Due process of law has always tended in
the other direction: the more serious the crime charged, the more
reason for making sure through meticulous judicial safeguards, such as
notice and hearing, that no mistake is ultimately made. The opposite
notion, as contained in Judge Frank's and Judge Hand's opinions has
frightening implications.1
6
until the case's end" formula clearly would not permit any more sensible disposition of
the inkwell thrower's case than the first alternative form of the argument. Even if Judge
Frank were correct in so narrowly characterizing the lawyers' arguments, this does not ex-
haust the issues presented by the case. That the two alternatives, in light of the language
in Terry's, Cooke's and Oliver's cases, clearly suggest the possibility of a third: The punish-
ment is justified by the need for speed and must be instant whether designed to prevent
disruption of the same case or not.
86. It is true that Terry's case contains language that could be taken to mean that the
no-hearing procedure is part of the punishment. The sentence quoted page 40 supra, says
there should be no delay because the hearing without apology might "justly be held to
aggravate the offense." So the court says in the excerpt cited on page 32 supra that the "ends
of justice demanded immediate action . .. that no explanation could disprove . .. that
he had committed such contempt of its authority and dignity as deserved instant punish-
ment." Again this is a possible interpretation but not likely in view of the fact that it goes
so much against the grain of well established principles of fairness. For material indicating
that in the English Common Law there was a tendency to try the more serious contempts
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(c) Impossibility and Unfairness of Making the Need for Speed a
Prerequisite for the No-Hearing Procedure.
As their final basis for rejecting the notion that the need for speed
was the only justification for conviction and punishment without a
hearing, Judges Hand and Frank proposed that this would result in
procedures that are both unworkable and unfair.
Judge Hand put it briefly: ". . . he [the judge] took no immediate
action to punish them for contempt. If he had done so, the result
would have been to have indicted defendants without effective counsel
or with the necessity of choosing new counsel-a procedure involving
interminable delay. He therefore abstained from any immediate
punishment but again and again warned the appellants that their con-
duct was improper." 87 In a case like the present he thought "it would
have been necessary either to abandon all attempts to curb disorderly
and contemptuous conduct or very seriously to interfere with the
progress of the trial. The course adopted by Judge Medina warned
the appellants that they were misconducting themselves at their peril.
It tended to prevent further obstruction, and also demonstrated that
its orders and warnings were not in vain by punishing the offenders
after the verdict was recorded, for flouting its authority. Any other
treatment of the contemptuous action would have been self-defeat-
ing." 
The most obvious answer to Judge Hand's point is that the lawyers
did not ask the Court of Appeals to rule that the judge should have
convicted and punished them without a hearing instantly after they
committed each offense. Instead they contended broadly that since
such instant conviction and punishment was apparently not necessary,
and since the method of warnings of which Judge Hand apparently
approved seemed to suffice to let the trial reach near completion, there
was no need for the sudden speedy procedure at this point. There is
nothing in Judge Hand's argument that suggests such a need except
what was suggested in the excerpts analyzed above, which would make
the no-hearing procedure part of the retribution or serve the function
of deterring future offenders in future cases.
Judge Frank, in elaborating on Judge Hand's position, stated in part
that the argument that "summary punishment must be instanter .. .
puts a premium on hasty action. It means that the judge may act
summarily only when he is least likely to be poised and temperate,
that only then may he act without a hearing. . . .We are asked by
appellants to believe that the constitutional safeguards of judicial
justice in the case of open court contempts will be best preserved, and
by jury see Nelles, Summary Power to Punish for Contempt, 31 CoL. L. REv. 956, 959, n. 10
(1931).
87. United States v. Sacher, 182 F.2d 416,428 (2nd Cir. 1950).
88. Id.at429.
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that 'dictatorial authority' in the punishment of such contempts will
be best avoided, if . . .we instruct trial judges that summary punish-
ment of such contempts must invariably be imposed at once, which
means that trial judges may punish such contempts when-and only
when-they act in hot blood, i.e., in circumstances promoting, to the
utmost, impatient, ill-considered judgment. We cannot accept that
view. For it seems exactly upside down." 89 In Judge Frank's view
the only workable rule seems to be to give the trial judge complete
discretion to proceed summarily or to direct a hearing.
Actually, it appears that Judge Frank's view is upside down. For
even though he understood the lawyers to state what he said they
stated, he does not meet the underlying issue by beating down this
straw man." The underlying issue is not whether judges should be
required to act in haste, but whether judges should be allowed to con-
vict and punish without a hearing where no haste is necessary.
Several courses may be open to a judge in a case of the Foley Square
type. He may simply warn the offender and try him subsequently,
giving him full notice and hearing. If the facts at the time of the
offense show that the judge exercising reasonable discretion could not
properly have found that this procedure would be insufficient to assure
the continued administration of justice, then the warning and subse-
quent conviction and punishment is the only procedure open to the
judge and no hasty summary conviction in "hot-blood" would stand
up on appeal.
Suppose, unlike what actually happened in the Foley Square case,
warnings prove totally useless. Still, the judge does not necessarily
have to break up the trial. He might, after carefully considering the
factors set out at the outset of this section of the article, decide that
there was a necessity to convict on the spot and postpone execution of
the punishment, as was done to the attorney in the Bridges case.91
This immediate conviction, without immediate execution of the punish-
ment, might produce the necessary shock to subdue the offender. The
trial could then go on, and the lawyers would be punished at the end
of the trial.
Judge Frank states that to "the extent that that practice would have
been in the interest of fairness, by way of warning to the lawyers, what
the judge did here was the equivalent." 92 But the no-hearing, imme-
diate conviction with postponed punishment technique can only be
89. Id. at 459.
90. See also note 86 supra.
91. Hallihan v. United States, 182 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1950). This aspect of the pro-
cedure is not discussed; the defense attorney was found guilty of contempt on November 22,
1949, but was granted stay of execution till completion of the trial. See Summary Con-
tempt: A Sword or a Shield?, 2 STAN. L. REv. 763, 769, n. 35 (1950).
92. United States v. Sacher, 182 F.2d 416,459 (2nd Cir. 1950).
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used if the facts show a necessity to use that procedure to assure the
continued administration of justice. Had Judge Medina actually pro-
ceeded by convicting immediately and postponing execution of
sentence until after the trial, he might very well have been upheld be-
cause on the basis of the record to that point it might have been rea-
sonable to conclude that this procedure was necessary to assure con-
tinuation of the trial. While such allowances should ordinarily be
made for the limits of judicial clairvoyance, in the Foley Square case
we can eliminate the crystal ball. The fact that the trial actually
continued with no more than warnings and the contempts became less
as it went along confirmed Judge Medina's "perspicacity." On this
basis the conviction, although it might have been upheld originally,
could not be upheld retroactively by translating the warning procedure
into an equivalent of the conviction procedure, as Judge Frank sug-
gested. 3
Related to these considerations there is still another respect in which
the procedure of immediate conviction and postponed punishment
differs from warnings followed by subsequent conviction and punish-
ment. If the judge undertakes the responsibility of immediately con-
victing the offender, he necessarily approaches his task with greater
solemnity for he must consider carefully, at the risk of possible reversal,
whether the acts justify the need for the speedy conviction. This, of
course, is not involved in warnings. It therefore cannot be known
whether Judge Medina actually would have been willing to convict
these defendants as frequently as he warned them.
94
Judge Clark hit these points hard:
"If the judge had acted immediately to punish summarily what he
deemed to be contempts, he would have done so as a responsible
decision upon the need then apparent to him; and the issue which
would thereupon have been presented to a reviewing court would
have been quite different from that now before us. It does not seem
to me appropriate or fruitful to try now to speculate how we might
then have decided. The point is that the judge actually decided
otherwise, and with perspicacity if we may conclude from the out-
come. Since he did decide to postpone action, our review must be
centered upon the legal consequences of that decision in the light
of the precedents; these are not properly to be reshaped or reversed
by speculation as to a different course he might have taken." 91
93. Perhaps in balancing the equation of necessity, see page 4 supra, it might be said
that an earlier conviction would be justified because it would have drastically reduced the
ultimate number of contempts. But this judgment too cannot be made at the end of the
proceedings where the first conviction never does occur and the invitation to further con-
tempts is consequently more open. It would mean that one upholds the conviction on six
contempts on the theory that had the first conviction actually taken place on the spot the
other five contempts would never have occurred, had the second conviction occurred right
there and then the remaining four contempts would never have occurred and so on.
94. See note 93 supra.
95. United States v. Sacher, 182 F.2d 416, 465 (2d Cir. 1950).
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As further proof of the inadequacy of any other procedure than that
followed by Judge Medina, Judge Frank's ever-lively imagination
suggests how the no-hearing conviction with deferred punishment
procedure might be abused:
"Had the judge, in each instance, cited and sentenced immediately
-although deferring execution-he would have been obliged to
stop this trial more than thirty times, in order to prepare, pursuant
to Rule 42(a) written orders specifying, in each instance, the par-
ticular contempt. Moreover, in such instance, the sentenced lawyer
would doubtless immediately have appealed, and would have had
the right to argue the appeal pro se. The trial judge would then
have had to adjourn the trial at least thirty times to allow the
lawyers to prepare and argue those appeals." 11
This statement illustrates graphically the misconception inherent in
Judge Frank's thinking which stems from equating the warning pro-
cedure with the immediate conviction procedure. He overlooks the
possibility that immediate conviction might have stopped or at least
slowed down further contempts. 7
Of course, the reader might say: "But suppose these men were out
to delay the trial, to obtain a mistrial, immediate conviction and post-
poned punishment might not have achieved anything." That may be
so. Lawyers really out to disrupt the trial at any cost can do so. The
judge then would have no alternative but to jail them on the spot;
and a new trial might have to be granted. This might have to be re-
peated until orderly lawyers are found. No less drastic procedure
would do any good under such circumstances. Certainly not the
procedure Judge Medina adopted here; nor as Judges Hand and Frank
seem to think, would the fact that such procedure were available be
more effective than the threat of a heavier fine or heavier jail sentence.
And it is, after all, Judge Medina's denial of a hearing at the time he
did so that must be justified. In a frantic effort to grasp something
that would do so, Judge Frank makes the following point which the
authors will simply state and let it go at that:
"In making up his mind, he could properly take into account that a
trial would be long drawn out. What would be the protracted
nature of the defense at such a trial was pretty clearly indicated by
defendant Gladstein. . . . That a poll be taken 'of the members
of the jury and the people of the press' and of others in the court-
room as to whether the judge had used 'a badgering bullying and
blustering tone' in addressing a witness. . . ... etc., etc."
96. Id. at 459.
97. See note 93 supra.
98. United States v. Sacher, 182 F.2d 416, 461 (2d Cir. 1950). The court also relied
on one federal Circuit Court case and several state court cases. In In re Maury, 205 Fed.
626 (9th Cir. 1913), the lawyer was punished a day after his contempt, while the jury was
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II. SoME FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS
The argument that Judge Medina exceeded the limitations on the
contempt power contained in the Federal rule gains further weight
when his conduct is considered in the light of restrictions of the Act of
Congress set forth below. A serious question may be raised as to
whether he did not violate the statute which specifies the situations
in which a judge may punish certain misbehavior without a jury trial
(with or without a hearing). In other words, it raises the question
could these lawyers be punished at all without a trial by jury.
The present statutory limitations on the contempt power of the
Federal Courts are contained in Section 401, U.S. Code, Tit. 18 which
reads: "A Court of the United States shall have power to punish by
fine or imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority
and none other, as-
"(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as
to obstruct the administration of justice;
"(2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions;
"(3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order,
rule, decree or command."
Section 401, U.S. Code, Tit. 18 is the present version of Section 1 of
an Act of Congress passed in 1831.99 The history of the abuse of the
contempt power which led to the enactment of the 1831 statute has
been thoroughly discussed elsewhere.1 0 A brief summary will suffice
here. It will be recalled that the federal statute was modeled partly
after earlier Pennsylvania 101 and New York legislation 102 and was
probably much influenced by the views of Edward Livingston.' 3 This
eminent legal reformer wanted to eliminate the contempt power as a
out to consider its verdict. He was convicted only after he was permitted to speak in his
own behalf. Middlebrook v. State, 43 Conn. 257 (1876), and In re Willis, 94 Wash. 180,
162 Pac. 38 (1917) involved delay due to the contemnor's flight from the courtroom. In re
Cary, 165 Minn. 203, 206 N.W. 402 (1925), quoted at length by Judge Hand, does seem to
say that while promptness is required, a delay in the case of an attorney until the end of the
trial might under certain circumstances be warranted. The proposition is in no way thought
out, and Terry's case is cited as authority. None of these cases, of course, is binding author-
ity on the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
99. The Federal Act of March 2, 1831, c. 98; 4 STAT. 487, § 1 (1831).
100. Fox, CONTEMPT OF COURT ch. 9 (1927); THOMAS, PROBLEMS OF CONTEMPT OF
COURT (1934); Frankfurter & Landis, Power of Congress over Procedure in Criminal Con-
tempts in "Inferior" Federal Courts-A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HARv. L. REV
1010 (1924); Nelles & King, Contempt by Publication, 28 COL. L. REV. 401, 525 (1928);
Nelles, The Summary Power to Punish for Contempt, 31 COL. L. REv. 956 (1931).
101. 1808-09 PA. ACTS, c. 78, p. 146.
102. N.Y. Rev. Stats. of 1829, Part iii, ch. iii, tit. 2, art. 1, § 10. See also Part iii, ch. viii,
tit. xiii, sec. 1 (civil contempts) and Pt. iv, ch. i, tit. iv, art. 2, and tit. vi, §§ 17, 18 (making
ordinary criminal procedure available to punish offenses previously punishable by summary
procedure). Nelles & King, supra note 100, at 528-29.
103. Id. at 418-422; Nelles, supra note 100, at 963-67 et seq.
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means of punishing disturbers and believed that summary powers
should be used simply to prevent interference with proceedings, leaving
punishment to result from a subsequent jury trial.0 4 While neither the
state nor federal legislation went so far in restricting contempt powers,
an attempt was made by appropriate language to prevent the repetition
of past abuses which had been directly responsible for the enactment of
these laws.
In Pennsylvania there had been three such incidents.' 05 In each a
party in a judicial proceeding had been punished without a jury for
contempt. The misbehavior consisted of publishing outside of court
critical statements charging malice and prejudice on the part of the
judge. Behind at least two of the cases there was a definite under-
current of a political controversy between Republicans and Federalists.
After impeachment proceedings against some of the judges, which
almost succeeded," 6 Pennsylvania passed its statute which limited
contempt punishment to misconduct of court officers, disobedience of
process and misbehavior "in the presence of the court obstructing the
administration of justice." It further specifically forbade non-jury
punishment for critical publication." 7
In New York, Chancellor Kent and two other Justices had permitted
the use of the contempt power to convict and punish without a jury a
master in Chancery, presumably an officer of the Court, for illegally
practicing as a solicitor, 08 despite the fact that such illegal practice
was under New York law an indictable offense triable by jury.' The
New York Court for the Trial of Impeachments and the Correction of
Errors, composed of the Chancellor, the Justices and the members of
the State Senate, discharged the matter. 110 It has been suggested that
it was probably because of this popular tribunal that it became un-
necessary to remedy the situation by immediate legislation."' But
under the influence of Livingston, legislation was eventually passed
which limited non-jury contempts to publications of false or grossly
inaccurate reports of judicial proceedings, resistance to process, refusal
104. Ibid.; 1 COMPLETE WORKS OF EDwARD LIVINGSTON ON CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE
264 et seq. (1873).
105. Respublica v. Oswald, 1 Dall. 319 (U.S. 1788); Hollingsworth v. Duane, Wall C.C.
77, 78 (1801); Baynard and Petit v. Passmore, 3 Yeates 439 (Pa. 1802); Respublica v. Pass-
more, 3 Yeates 441 (Pa. 1802). The cases are discussed in Nelles & King, supra note 100,
at 409-15.
106. WILLIAM HAMILTON, REPORT OF THE TRIAL AND AcQUITTAL OF SHIPPEN, C.J.,
AND YEATES AND SM1ITH, JJ. (1805); Nelles & King, supra note 100, at 414.
107. See note 101 supra.
108. Case of J.V.N. Yates, 4 Johns. 316 (N.Y. 1809).
109. Nelles & King, supra note 100, at 416.
110. 6 Johns. 337 (N.Y. 1810). Nelles & King, supra note 100, at 416, make this sig-
nificant point: "It is believed that the decision was sound upon this ground at least: that
the statute under which Yates' offense was indictable had ousted pro tanto the ancient sum-
mary disciplinary jurisdiction of the Chancellor over officers of his court."
111. Id. at 418.
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of witnesses to answer proper questions, breaches of the peace tending
to interrupt the court's proceedings, and "disorderly, contemptuous or
insolent behavior committed during its sitting, in its immediate view
and presence, and directly tending to interrupt its proceedings, or to
impair the respect due to its authority." 112
The most notorious federal incident of judicial abuse was the famous
Peck-Lawless case which occurred against a colorful political back-
ground of disputed land claims following the Louisiana purchase.
District Judge Peck had imprisoned and disbarred attorney Lawless
for publishing critical remarks about one of his opinions while the case
was on appeal. Impeachment proceedings were brought against the
Judge. Though Judge Peck was acquitted,1 3 Congress changed the
earlier Act of 1789 which simply had empowered federal courts to
punish all "contempts of authority in any cause or hearing before the
same" to the language substantially as set out above."
4
Clause (3) of Section 401 is not involved in this case since it seems to
pertain to the disobedience of formal orders or decrees. Clauses (1) and
(2), however, raise questions as to the validity of Judge Medina's
action.
I. Clause (z) of Section 401
The phrase in Clause (1), "in its presence or so near thereto as to
obstruct the administration of justice" is not as restrictive as the lan-
guage of Rule 42(a) that "he [the judge] saw or heard the conduct con-
stituting the contempt and that it was committed in the actual presence
of the court." Nevertheless, under its interpretation by the Supreme
Court, the statute still imposes important limitations which at least
throw serious doubt on Judge Medina's action insofar as the certificate
can be construed to charge a conspiracy which originated out of court.
At first the statute was taken as a serious limitation on the con-
tempt power of the Federal courts."' But later in Toledo Newspaper
Co. v. United States,"6 the Supreme Court declared that the statute
112. Id. at 418-21. See note 102 supra.
113. The vote was 22 to 21. STANSBUY, TRiAL OF JA MEs H. PECK 474 (1833).
114. See page 47 supra.
115. United States v. Holmes, Fed. Cas. No. 15, 383, 363 (1842); Ex parte Poulson, Fed.
Cas. No. 11,350 (1835); United States v. New Bedford Bridge, Fed. Cas. No. 15, 867 (1847);
United States v. Emerson, Fed. Cas. No. 15, 050 (1831) cited by Mr. Justice Douglas in
Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 48 (1941). See also Ex parte Robinson, 19 Wall. 505,
510-11 (U.S. 1873); Nelles & King, supra note 100, at 532 n.28. On the constitutionality of
the statute see Frankfurter & Landis, Power of Congress over Procedures in Criminal Con-
tempts in "Inferior" Federal Courts-A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HARv. L. Rv.
1010 (1924); 19 U. OF Cm. L. REv. 669, 678 (1948).
116. 247 U.S. 402 (1918). The City of Toledo had passed a controversial ordinance
providing that the Toledo Railway and Light Company could only charge a three cent fare
from day to day. The city had also refused to renew the company's franchise. The creditors
of the company and the company brought suit seeking to enjoin the city from enforcing the
ordinance. The Toledo News-Bee attacked the position taken by the creditors and the
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"conferred no power not already granted and imposed no limitations
not already existing" and concluded that the words "so near thereto"
do not limit the power to misbehavior near the court in a geographical
sense but on the contrary "recognized and sanctioned . . . the power
to restrain acts tending to obstruct and prevent the untrammelled and
unprejudiced exercise of the judicial power . . . by summarily treat-
ing such acts as a contempt and punishing accordingly." 117 How-
ever, in Nye v. United States,11 the Supreme Court overruled the
Toledo Newspaper case. Mr. Justice Douglas stated:
"The question is whether the words 'so near thereto' have a geo-
graphical or causal connotation. Read in their context and in the
light of their ordinary meaning, we conclude that they are to be
construed as geographical terms. . . . The phrase 'so near thereto
as to obstruct the administration of justice' likewise connotes that
the misbehavior must be in the vicinity of the court. . . . It is not
sufficient that the misbehavior charged has some direct relation to
the work of the court. 'Near' in this context juxtaposed to 'pres-
ence' suggests physical proximity not relevancy. . . . There may,
of course, be many types of 'misbehavior' which will 'obstruct the
administration of justice' but which may not be 'in' or 'near' to the
'presence' of the Court. . . . If 'so near thereto' be given a causal
meaning, then § 268 [Section 401(1), Tit. 18] by the process of
judicial construction will have regained much of the generality
which Congress in 1831 emphatically intended to remove. . . . If
that phrase be not restricted to acts in the vicinity of the court
but be allowed to embrace acts which have a 'reasonable tendency'
to 'obstruct the administration of justice' . . . then the conditions
which Congress sought to alleviate in 1831 have largely been re-
stored. . . . We cannot by the process of interpretation obliterate
the distinctions which Congress drew." 119
From this it seems fairly clear that insofar as Judge Medina relied
on the out-of-court agreement as the misbehavior for which these de-
fendants were punished, the summary punishment was not within his
power under Clause (1) of Section 401. It nowhere appeared in his
charge or elsewhere that the agreement took place in the geographic
vicinity of the court.
Here again, it might be argued that since the consequences of the
agreement occurred in court, the misbehavior charged, even insofar
as it included the agreement, occurred "in the presence of the court"
or "so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice" within
company and also attacked an order attaching one Quinlivan for contempt for making
speeches about the case before a labor union, and a court order attaching the managing
editor of the News-Bee for contempt. Both the Newspaper company and the editor were
punished by way of fine. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction.
117. 247 U.S.402,418-19 (1918).
118. 313 U.S. 33 (1941).
119. Id. at 48-50.
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the meaning of the statute. But the facts and decision in the Nye case
as well as several other cases decided by the federal courts since the
Nye decision, seem to foreclose this possible circumvention of the
restriction imposed by the statute. In the Nye case, the defendant
had sought to terminate an administrator's suit for wrongful death in a
federal district court by corruptly inducing a feeble and illiterate ad-
ministrator, named Elmore, to drop the action. Mr. Justice Douglas
commented as follows:
"The conduct of petitioners (if the facts found are taken to be true)
was highly reprehensible. It is of a kind which corrupts the judicial
process and impedes the administration of justice. . . .The acts
complained of took place miles from the District Court. The evil
influence which affected Elmore was in no possible sense in the
'presence' of the court or 'near thereto.' So far as the crime of con-
tempt is concerned, the fact that the judge received Elmore's letter is
inconsequential.
"We may concede that there was an obstruction in the administra-
tion of justice, as evidenced by the long delay and large expense
which the reprehensible conduct of petitioners entailed. . . .The
fact that in purpose and effect there was an obstruction in the
administration of justice did not bring the condemned conduct
within the vicinity of the court in any normal meaning of the term.
It was not misbehavior in the vicinity of the court disrupting the
quiet and order or actually interrupting the court in the conduct of
its business .... Hence it was not embraced within [Section 401].
"120
An argument based on the ever recurring conspiracy theory would
have no more validity here than under Rule 42. Again, it would be an
importation of a fiction from an unrelated context to .open a wide loop-
hole which would allow the undue expansion of a power which it has
been the policy of the Supreme Court and the Congress to restrict.
121
120. Id. at 52 (emphasis supplied). See also Wimberly v. United States, 119 F.2d 713
(5th Cir. 1941).
121. See in addition to the Pendergast case, supra note 62, the Pennsylvania case of
Mark's Appeal, 144 Pa. Super. 556 (1941), where the court seemed to stress that the sum-
mary contempt power could not be used where the alleged conspiracy was planned out of
court. The question may be raised what connection is there between the necessities for
orderly procedure and the "geographical vicinity" test. What greater necessity is there for
dispensing with a jury trial when a witness has been bribed in the waiting room rather than
in his hotel room?
The answer to this question may be discovered by considering a more fundamental one.
What necessity can there ever be for dispensing with a jury trial but not with a hearing?
Here again, the timing factor may be controlling. There may well be situations where the
necessity for terminating the interruption and restoring orderly judicial procedure is such
as not to permit of the delay involved in examining a jury and conducting a trial before it,
although not such as to justify dispensing with the more expeditious procedure of a hearing
before a judge. Another explanation for dispensing with a jury trial but not with a hearing
may rest in the notion that in certain situations the independence of the tribunal must be
protected against the passing passions of the moment even as they might be reflected in a
jury's verdict.
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Similarly, a construction of the certificate which regards the agreement,
not as part of any contempt, but merely as a circumstance of in-court
misbehavior, influencing the extent of the punishment is as fallacious
here as under the Federal Rule.
2. Clause (2) of Section 401
The question remains whether Judge Medina's action is authorized
under Clause (2) of Section 401 which empowers the court to punish
the misbehavior of officers of the court in "official transactions." Is
this provision limited by the Nye case or may officers in their "official
transactions" be punished even though the misbehavior does not occur
in the presence of or in the geographical vicinity of the court. Un-
fortunately, there is no authoritative answer to this question. Little
is known of the actual congressional intent since there were no pub-
lished debates concerning the act of 1831.122 It should be remembered,
however, that the Peck case which in part precipitated the passage of
the act, involved a critical publication by a lawyer about a judge who
had tried one of his cases which was still pending on appeal. Too broad
an interpretation of the "misbehavior of officers" clause would mean
that a lawyer in a similar situation could be punished for contempt
without a jury trial. This, probably, was not the intention of Congress.
Was, then, the intention of Congress such as to authorize punishment
for out-of-court misbehavior in connection with the preparation by a
lawyer of his client's case? In other words, is such misconduct in-
cluded within the meaning of Clause (2) of Section 401?
Since the Nye case there have been a series of federal cases which
have thrown some light on the "misbehavior of officers" clause. In
In re Michael,1 23 a trustee in bankruptcy had been held in contempt
for testifying falsely before a grand jury in the course of a general
investigation of frauds against the government. It was argued before
the Supreme Court of the United States that even though no further
necessary element of obstruction except perjury was "clearly shown,"
the defendant here ought to be convicted without a jury trial because
he was an officer of the Court. Mr. Justice Black had this to say:
On the basis of these considerations, it might be thought that the court in each case
raising the issue of dispensing with a jury trial, would have to consider criteria so difficult of
application and would have so wide a latitude for judgment as to prove unduly dangerous
if the judge were unscrupulous or unwise. Probably for this reason, a more measurable
standard has been evolved. The principle thus seems to have crystallized in a rough and
ready but workable rule of thumb, the "geographical vicinity" test, as explained by Justice
Douglas in the Nye case. It is apparently based on the presumption that misconduct which
occurs in the geographical vicinity of the court is the type of interruption which will require
action so prompt as to make necessary the elimination of jury trial. The test also provides
for the statute the same type of concrete standard as the "seen and heard" and "actual
presence" portions of the test under Rule 42 (a).
122. See THOMAS, PROBLEMS OF CONTEMPT OF COURT 55 (1934).
123. 326 U.S. 224 (1945).
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"Nor can the conviction be upheld under that part of Sec. 268
[Section 401, Title 18] which authorizes punishment for contempts
which consist of 'the misbehavior of any of the officers of said courts
in their official transactions.' While the petitioner was a trustee,
and we may assume an officer of the Court within the statutory
meaning, he was not engaged in an 'official transaction' as trustee
when he testified before the Grand Jury in the course of a general
inquiry. Whether he could be punished for contempt for giving
perjured testimony in the course of proceedings directly involving
administration of the estate is another matter not now before
US." 124
This case can hardly be taken to be a holding on the precise Foley
Square situation. But it does indicate that the Supreme Court tends
to interpret the clause restrictively and in the light of the purpose of
the 1831 legislation, which as has been shown is to limit the contempt
power to the minimum necessary to preserve order. Another recent
case to be noted is Klein v. United States.12 5 There Klein, an attorney
in the famous 'World W¥ar II seditionist trial, asked the Judge to be
excused from continuing to represent his client in the case and left
without getting leave from the Court. He was held in contempt. The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed on the ground
that the attorney's misbehavior was not in the "presence" of the Court
or "so near thereto" as to obstruct the administration of justice. In
commenting on the applicability of the "misbehavior of officer" clause,
it simply stated that clause 2 of § 401 was "clearly" inapplicable.
Again in Schmidt v. United States,1 6 an attorney had filed false affida-
vits with the Clerk of the District Court while the Court was not in
session. The Circuit Court of Appeal for the Sixth Circuit held with-
out extensive discussion that the misbehavior was not contemptuous
as "misbehavior" of an officer of the court in his "official transactions."
On the basis of these cases we can conclude at least that there is a
great deal of doubt whether the "misbehavior of officer" clause can be
applied to the lawyers in the Foley Square trial insofar as the con-
tempt consisted of misbehavior which was a part of the out-of-court
and presumably pre-trial preparation of their case. Of course, if the
alleged out-of-court agreement had no connection with the preparation
of the case or the conduct of the litigation, it is clear that clause (2) is
inapplicable. Any time the contempt power is applied against a lawyer,
not only does it affect his interests but it may also impair the interest
of his client in that vigorous and full advocacy which is one of his tradi-
tional rights. This would suggest the desirability of a more careful and
perhaps restricted use of the contempt power against lawyers than
against others. A construction of clause (2) of Section 401 so that it
124. Id. at 229.
125. 151 F.2d 286 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
126. 124 F.2d 177 (6th Cir. 1941).
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applies to lawyers in their out-of-court preparation of litigation would
do precisely the opposite.
127
3. Appropriate Procedure Against These Lawyers
From what has been said, it appears highly doubtful that the law-
yers in the Foley Square trial could be punished under Section 401 of
Title 18 which states the conditions under which Federal courts may
punish for contempt without a jury trial. It does not follow, however,
that they could not be prosecuted under existing legislation of Con-
gress. The second section of the Act of 1831 (now section 1503 of
Title 18) provides as follows:
"That if any person or persons shall, corruptly, or by threats or
force, endeavor to influence, intimidate, or impede any juror, wit-
ness, or officer, in any court of the United States, in the discharge
of his duty, or shall, corruptly, or by threats of force, obstruct, or
impede, or endeavor to obstruct or impede; the due administra-
tion of justice therein, every person or persons, so offending, shall
be liable to prosecution therefor, by indictment, and shall, on con-
viction thereof, be punished, by fine not exceeding five hundred
dollars, or by imprisonment, not exceeding three months, or both,
according to the nature and aggravation of the offence." 128
This section has been repeatedly applied to various conspiracies 129
to obstruct the administration of justice and there is little doubt that
it would be applicable to the type of agreement charged by Judge
Medina. By its very language it is applicable to the individual charges.
It thus appears that Congress intended to make the type of alleged mis-
behavior involved in the Foley Square trial punishable by jury trial.
This is a further indication that it ought not to be punished by con-
tempt unless there is both the clearest showing of necessity as well as
compliance with the letter of the contempt authorization in Section (1).
127. Nelles, The Summary Power to Punish for Contempt, 31 COL. L. REV. 956 (1931)
states at 964: "The Court, like the general of an army must maintain discipline among
subordinates .... Except with respect to attorneys, as to whose discipline there has grown
up a distinct and satisfactory body of law and practice. Its use is mainly in Terrorem. It
rarely encroaches upon the domain of ordinary criminal proceedings. It seems appropriate
that an embezzling receiver should be committed until he makes good his defalcations, if he
is able. But should his criminal punishment be imposed in a summary proceeding?"
128. Act of March 2, 1831, c. 98, 41STAT. 487, § 2 (1831). 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501, 1504-6
(1946) have elaborated the old statute by making specific crimes out of assault on process
server, resistance to extradition agent, influencing juror by writing, influencing or injuring
witness before agencies and committees, theft or alteration or records and process and false
bail.
129. See, for example, United States v. Johnson, 165 F.2d 42 (3d Cir. 1942), cert. denied,
332 U.S. 852 (1948), motion granted, 68 S.Ct. 357 (1948), rehearing denied, 68 S.Ct. 457
(1948); United States v. Manton, 107 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 664
(1940); Craig v. United States, 81 F.2d 816 (9th Cir. 1936), 298 U.S. 690 (1936), rehearing
denied, 299 U.S. 620 (1936). The prosecution would be under the general conspiracy statute.
18 U.S.C. § 371 (1948).
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As Mr. Justice Douglas states in Nye v. United States, unless the dis-
tinction between § 1 and § 2 of the Act of 1831 is clearly kept in mind,
"[t]he result will be that the offenses which Congress designated as
true crimes under § 2 . . .will be absorbed as contempts wherever
they may take place." "I
It thus appears that the Federal statute, by its terms, provides a
procedure for dealing with misconduct such as was charged against the
Foley Square lawyers and that there is grave doubt, under other provi-
sions, whether trial by jury can be dispensed with. These doubts may
or may not turn out eventually to be well founded. Their existence at
this time, however, lends strength to the argument that the stricter
provisions of Rule 42 should not be so loosely construed as to dispense
even with a hearing. In a case such as this where there is serious doubt
whether the policy of our law permits the elimination of a jury trial,
there ought to be far less doubt that at the very least a hearing is re-
quired.
Judge Medina's error in failing to accord these lawyers a hearing
under Rule 42(a) is compounded by his failure to accord them the
specific safeguards assured by Rule 42(b). As will be recalled, Rule
42(b) not only deals with the necessity for notice and hearing, but with
another element of due process of law, the impartiality of the tribunal:
"If the contempt charged involves disrespect to or criticism of a judge,
that judge is disqualified from presiding at the trial or hearing except
with the defendant's consent." This provision, of course, is of the
utmost importance, particularly in a case where the relations between
counsel and the judge, as evidenced by many acrimonious exchanges,
are such as to "blur judicial impartiality." 131 Chief Justice Taft said:
"[T]his rule of caution is more mandatory where the contempt
charged has in it the element of personal criticism or attack upon
the judge. The judge must banish the slightest personal impulse to
reprisal, but he should not bend backvard and injure the authority
of the court by too great leniency. The substitution of another
judge would avoid either tendency but it is not always possible. Of
course, where acts of contempt are palpably aggravated by a per-
sonal attack upon the judge in order to drive the judge out of the
case for ulterior reasons, the scheme should not be permitted to,
succeed. But attempts of this kind are rare. All of such cases, how-
ever, present difficult questions for the judge. All we can say upon
the whole matter is that where conditions do not make it im-
practicable, or where the delay may not injure public or private
right, a judge called upon to act in a case of contempt by personal
130. 313 U.S. 33, 49-50 (1941). On the possible effect of such criminal provisions on the
scope of the contempt power over "officers of the court" see note 110 supra. There is of
course, also the possibility of disbarment as a means of disciplining lawyers.
131. See Schmidt v. United States, 115 F.2d 394, 397 (6th Cir. 1940).
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attack upon him, may, without flinching from his duty, properly
ask that one of his fellow judges take his place." 132
There is no doubt but what Judge Medina was presented with
"difficult questions." It is not apparent, however, that, almost at the
end of the trial when the contempt findings were made, conditions were
"impracticable" or that the delay involved in notice, hearing and the
designation of another judge would have injured "public or private
right."
The contempt certificate, with the many colloquies between counsel
and the judge, leaves no doubt that the lawyers made repeated personal
attacks on the judge. And although this is enough to make applicable
the disqualification provision of Rule 42(b), the record also discloses
that the judge was affected by such attacks in the precise way which
has made these provisions necessary. Judge Medina was piqued.
1 33
132. Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 539 (1925).
133. Whether Judge Medina's anger was justified by the insistent interruptions of
defense counsel is, of course, not relevant to the issues discussed here. The point of Rule
42(b) is that the judge cannot be impartial when he is moved by passions. Justified anger,
no less than personal petulance, requires the disqualification of the judge concerned. See
text supra.
That Judge Medina often felt personal anger is clear from the contempt citations
themselves. The following excerpt is drawn from Specification XXXII, 182 F.2d at 447-48,
which reads in part:
"On August 3, 1949, during the direct examination of the witness Geraldyne Lightfoot
by Isserman, she was asked a question to which the Government objected. The Court
undertook to elicit the information sought by a direct question. In order to forestall an
answer, Messrs. Isserman and Gladstein provoked a disorderly disturbance and succeeded
in preventing an answer to the question, as follows (Tr. 11, 269-11, 274):
"The Court: Mrs. Lightfoot, in this matter of the strategy of the workers, did you dis-
cuss the dictatorship of the proletariat, imperialism, and just and unjust wars, and things
of that kind, or were they not mentioned?
"Mr. Isserman: I object to the question.
"The Court: Overruled.
"The Witness: Under topic 3-under topic C-
"The Court: You will answer that question yes or no or state that you cannot answer it.
"Mr. Gladstein: I object to the Court's tone and manner of badgering the witness.
"The Court: There is nothing about my tone, and you will please sit down.
"Mr. Gladstein: I desire to make an objection.
"The Court: Mr. Marshal, will you just-(To the reporter) Read the question to the
witness.
"We will have no more monkey business here.
"Mr. Gladstein: I object to the ruling.
"Mr. Isserman: I object to the Court's remark.
"The Court: You will sit down, Mr. Gladstein.
"Mr. Isserman: And I want to register an objection to the Court's ruling.
"The Court: Very well.
"Mr. Isserman: As prejudicial to the conduct of the case and to the defense and making
the defense impossible.
"The Court: When I desire to ask a question, I am going to ask it. I am through with
the interference of counsel.
"Now go ahead and read the question, Mr. Reporter.
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"Mr. Isserman: May I ask the Court a question?
"The Court: You may not. (Question read.)
"Mr. Isserman: I object to that question.
"The Court: Overruled.
A. Under C I discussed-
"The Court: Mrs. Lightfoot, did you hear me tell you to answer that question, either
that you did discuss those subjects or that you did not discuss those subjects? Now, which
was it? You did discuss them or you did not discuss them?
"Mr. Isserman: I object to that question.
"The Court: Overruled.
"Mr. Gladstein: Your Honor-
"The Court: Overruled. I don't want to hear anything from you, Mr. Gladstein.
[There followed a brief interchange between the Court and the witness, and then a
further objection by Mr. Isserman. The Court agreed to rephrase his question:]
"The Court: I will reform my question.
"Did you mention to the class in.that lecture the subject of the dictatorship of the
Proletariat?
"The Witness: I didn't mention it at that lecture-
"Mr. Isserman: Just a minute. First of all I wish to object to your Honor's question-
"The Court: Mr. Isserman, I am not going to have any interference here. Now you will
just go over there and sit down and then you can say what you want to say afterwards.
"Now, Mr. Marshal, just escort Mr. Isserman over to the seat.
"Mr. Isserman: I would like to make an objection to your Honor's question. Am I
allowed to do it?
"The Court: You have made it. Go back and sit down there. (The marshal escorts Mr.
Isserman to the seat.) (Mr. Isserman rises.)
"Mr. Isserman: Well, I rise now to object to your Honor's question.
"The Court: Overruled. (Mr. Isserman is seated.)
"The Court: Now, Mrs. Lightfoot, you will give me a direct and responsive answer to
that question. In that lecture did you discuss the subject-did you mention the subject of
the dictatorship of the Proletariat?
"Mr. Isserman: I object to that question.
"The Court: Overruled.
"Mr. Marshal, will you show Mr. Isserman to his seat?
"Mr. Isserman: May I not stand at this point?
"The Court: You will sit right down. I have had enough contemptuous conduct from
you and I am not going to have any more.
"Mr. Isserman: I am not aware of any contemptuous conduct.
"The Court: Well, you will be aware, all right.
"Mr. Isserman: I would like to object to your Honor's remark and I move for a mistrial
because your Honor has made the defense impossible.
"The Court: Mr. Marshal, get busy. (Mr. Isserman sits down.)
"The Court (to witness): Now answer that question.
"Mr. Isserman: I object to that.
"The Court: Overruled.
"The Witness: The question-may I hear the question again now; after so much I do
not remember it.
"The Court: The reporter will read it-or I will ask you again:
"In that lecture did you mention the subject of the dictatorship of the proletariat?
"Mr. Isserman: I object to that question.
"The Court: Overruled.
"A. In the beginning of that-
"The Court: All right, I sustain the objection to that question. We will have no more
of it.
"Go ahead with your next question, Mr. Isserman."
